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ARTICLES
THE CORPORATION AS A TOCQUEVILLIAN
ASSOCIATION
Ronald J Colombo*
The Supreme Court's 2010 ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Conmission re-energized the debate over the proper role of corporations in the
political process. Some have welcomed the decision as an application of the
Constitution's limits upon governmental regulation of political speech. Others have
bemoaned the decision for equating corporate spending with free speech, thereby
deprivinggovernment of the power to effectively safeguard the electoralprocess. Both
sides of the debate, however, appearfixated upon a "one-size-fits-all " answer to the
question of corporatepolitical involvement. This is both unfortunate and inaccurate,
for it undermines the construction of a positive path forward and obfuscates the truth
of things.
Corporationsare marked by a tremendous degree of variation and diversity, and
our approach to corporate involvement in the political process ought to take this
importantfact into account. Many corporations live up to their characterization as
simply profit-maximizing machines. To equate their "speech" with the speech of a
human being would seem odd andproblematic.
But some corporations belie such characterization. Some are genuine
communities-a coming together of investors, business people, employees and
customers arounda particularvision ofthe good. They are marked by specific cultures,
and adhere to certain principles. Such corporationsprovide people not merely with
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Maritza Karmely, Jeffrey Lipshaw, and Anthony Polito thereof) for hosting a workshop of the Article. Finally,
I am indebted to Alexandria Sawyer and Cynthia Thomas for their most able research assistance.
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goods, services, and jobs, but also the harmony that accompanies a life lived
consistently-a life where employment andpurchasingdecisions are not separatefrom
the value judgments that are constitutive of human character. These corporations
should be recognized as "Tocquevillian Associations." And their participationin the
political process ought to be vigorously welcomed. Indeed, their participationin the
politicalprocess is arguably essential to the health of our democratic republic.
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INTRODUCTION

Although the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission' has largely been characterized as a statement on corporate rights
if not corporate personhood, 2 the decision (and even the dissent) explicitly disavows

1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. E.g., Matthew A. Melone, Citizens United and Corporate PoliticalSpeech: Did the Supreme Court
Enhance PoliticalDiscourse or Invite Corruption?,60 DEPAUL L. REv. 29, 80 (2010), Anne Tucker, Flwe
Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61
CASE W. RS. L. REv. 497,.498 (2011).
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making any such statement.3 Instead, the decision is framed as entirely one having to
do with Congressional power to regulate speech-the speaker (in this case, the
corporation) being irrelevant. 4
That said, the decision has raised the interesting normative question of what rights
a corporation should possess. And the question is an important one for at least a couple
of reasons, notwithstanding the limited grounds upon which Citizens United was
explicitly decided.
First, attacks upon Citizens United continue unabated, with various efforts
5
underway or otherwise proposed for limiting or undoing the decision. Some have, for
6
example, suggested using state corporate law to reign in corporate political speech.
Although the U.S. Constitution might preclude Congress from restricting corporate
speech, 7 it does not necessarily preclude state governments from amending corporate
law in a way that effectively restricts the ability of entities incorporated within their
jurisdiction from exercising this right.8 Thus, the issue of what rights a corporation

3. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 ("The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech
of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because
such associations are not 'natural persons."'); id at 972 n.72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("[i]t is not necessary to agree on a precise theory of the corporation to agree that corporations differ from
natural persons in fundamental ways"). But see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and The Corporate
Form, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 999, 1001 (2010) (asserting that "both the majority and the dissent in Citizens United
adopt[ed] the real entity view [of the corporation]").
4. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900; see also idat 972 n.72 (noting that the theoretical conception of the
corporation is also irrelevant).
5. See David. A. Westbrook, If Not a Commercial Republic? Political Economy in the United States

After Citizens United, 50 U. LoUISVILLE L. REv. 35, 83-84 (2011) (listing the different institutions and
methods in which the case could be "rolled back").
6. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond Citizens United: The Solution, ACS BLOG (Jan. 21, 2010),

http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/node/15154. Others have introduced federal legislation to the same effect. See
David Katz & Laura McIntosh, Limitations on Contributions Would Undercut Directors, N.Y. L.J., July 28,

2011, at 5 (discussing the Shareholder Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 2517, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011)).
7. Nonetheless, some members of Congress are attempting to effectively stymie corporate speech
through indirect means. See Ambreen Ali, House Considers Citizens United Bills, CONGRESS.ORG (Mar. 11,
2010), https://ssl.congress.org/news/2010/03/1 1/house considers citizens united-bills (discussing the efforts
to promote a bill that makes company shareholders vote on any corporate spending).
8. A fascinating and important question is the extent to which a state govemment, through the corporate
chartering process, may restrict federal constitutional rights recognized as applicable to corporations. Although
the mainstream understanding is that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits many such restrictions, see Darrell
A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate ConstitutionalRights, 86

N.Y.U. L. REv. 887, 910-11 (2011); Henri G. Minette, San Bernardino Physicians' Services Medical Group,
Inc. v. County of San Bernardino: Constitutionally Protected Public Contract Property Interests Under 42

U.S.C. Section 1983, 74 MINN. L. REv. 879, 902 (1990), others are less convinced, see Matthew Lambert,
Beyond CorporateSpeech: CorporatePowers in a FederalistSystem, 37 RUTGERs L. REc. 20, 21 (2010) ("A

proper analysis of the corporate form and the Constitution's applicability thereto dictates that a corporation's
rights are contingent upon that which is given to it by the incorporating state, including political, press, and
other protected forms of speech."). Additionally, the Montana Supreme Court attempted to distinguish Citizens
United so as to uphold its own regulation of corporate campaign spending. See W. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v.
Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 13 (Mont. 2011), revd sub nom. Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct.
2490 (2012) (striking down a Montana statute purporting to restrict political speech under Citizens United).
These interesting issues are sadly beyond the scope of this Article, which shall focus on the propriety of
corporate free speech rights generally, and, consequently, the propriety of efforts to facilitate versus undermine

4
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ought to have remains a lively and significant one.
Second, "congressional power to regulate speech" and "corporate rights" are not
hermetically sealed off from one another, notwithstanding how Citizens United has
been framed and generally understood. A significant amount of overlap exists.
Congress's power to regulate speech (or not) only affects corporations to the extent that
corporations are able "to speak." To the layperson, it may seem obvious that
corporations can "speak"-indeed, corporations appear to do so all the time.
Corporations run commercials, take out newspaper ads, and even have official
"spokespersons." Conversely, burning a flag, or dancing topless, might not obviously
constitute "speech" to the layperson-although the courts have held otherwise. 9 For the
term "speech," as used in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is a term of art
that has a particular legal meaning.' 0 As such, we must ultimately confront the
question: are corporations capable of "speaking" as this term is understood within the
context of the First Amendment? Or, more accurately in light of Citizens United(which
has answered that question in the affirmative), should corporations be construed as
entities capable of "speaking" as per the First Amendment?
As an answer to that question, I firmly suggest: it depends.
Corporations come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes. They differ dramatically
in a number of essential details, including structure, organization, profitability, culture,
and mission.'I To lump together as "corporations" all these divergent enterprises for
purposes of either extending or denying free speech rights is a gross oversimplification.
In order to properly address the question of corporate speech, what is needed is a
better appreciation of this diversity.12 Instead of treating all incorporated business
entities as the same under the First Amendment, we ought to recognize that
corporations can differ dramatically from one another, and we should expect our First
Amendment jurisprudence to take this important fact into account.
This comports with the historical treatment of the corporation-which has varied

those rights. For even if the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from stripping free speech rights from
corporations via the chartering process, there are certainly measures short of that which would have the effect
of significantly thwarting the exercise of such rights. See Greenwood, supra note 6, at 104 (proposing revision
of incorporation statutes to require approval of corporate political expenditures via a majority vote of "every
human corporate stakeholder who is a US citizen and might be affected by the decision or expenditure,
including directors, managers, employees, human investors (or the human beneficiaries of institutional
investors), customers, suppliers and taxpayers who might have to pay additional taxes to replace taxes
corporate taxpayers avoid or to clean up messes that such decision might allow.").
9. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990) (holding that burning a flag is protected
speech under the First Amendment); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932-33 (1975) (stating that nude
dancing may be entitled to First Amendment protection in some circumstances).
10. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 12-1,

at 789 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing

the competing societal consensus that make it difficult to have a straightforward definition of speech for
constitutional purposes).
11. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standardfor Imposing Corporate CriminalLiability, 75
MINN. L. REv. 1095, 1123-27 (1991).
12. But see John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, A Callfor a Unfied Business Organization Law, 65
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 33-34 (1996) (recommending a simplification of business organization law by
replacing the various organizational forms available under existing law with one standard form of organization
to which all new businesses must adhere).
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from era to era in light of changing facts and circumstances. It also comports with
practice in our own time-which, in many situations, treats one corporation differently
from the next due to relevant distinguishing characteristics.
Once we eschew a one-size-fits-all approach toward corporate free speech rights,
we next must establish a means by which to appropriately distinguish those
corporations that should be afforded robust First Amendment protections from those
corporations that should not. For such purposes, I suggest we turn to the political
theory of Alexis de Tocqueville. More specifically, I suggest we employ Tocqueville's
theory of associations.
Tocqueville stressed the vital importance of associations to democratic forms of
government. It is my contention that among the vast diversity of corporations, a modest
number of them fit the description of an "association" as per Alexis de Tocqueville's
use of that term. As such, it is not only appropriate for those corporations fitting this
description to have First Amendment rights, but indeed it is absolutely essential.
This Article is organized as follows: As predicate to the argument that not all
corporations ought to enjoy identical treatment under the First Amendment, Section II
will demonstrate the diversity of entities that are called "corporations." It will show
how, historically and in our present day, law has taken-and continues to take-into
account salient factual realities in its regulation of the corporation.
Section III will discuss the interrelated phenomena of corporate personhood and
corporate free speech rights. It will show how these phenomena suffer from a lack of
theorization. Moreover, it will show that these phenomena have not generally tracked
the historical realities of the corporate form, but rather have developed (largely)
independent of such realities.
Section IV will introduce Tocqueville's theory of associations and explain how
this theory can serve as an appropriate and suitable means of theorizing corporate free
speech rights. Section V will provide a sketch of how to go about categorizing
corporations (namely as free-speech-deserving versus free-speech-undeserving) in
practice.
In sum, to the extent that a corporation can be characterized as a Tocquevillian
corporation, it ought to enjoy the fullest protections of the First Amendment as per
Citizens United. To the extent that corporations cannot be so characterized, a broad
application of Citizens United to them would seem unwarranted and potentially
dangerous.
II.

CORPORATE DIVERSITY

Entities which we call "corporations" differ dramatically from one another-both
historically and in our present time. This Section will set forth those dramatic
differences.
Historically, as the corporation changed over time, so did its conceptualization.
This changing conception of the corporation, in turn, impacted the ways in which the
entity was regulated. This was both understandable and beneficial: the law did not
persist in applying yesteryear's laws, based upon yesteryear's theories, to the evolving
corporate entity. Instead, theory and law were adapted to conform to the factual
realities of the corporate enterprise. Part II.A will set forth this history.

TEMPLELAWREVIEW
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And despite a general consensus over the nature of the corporation today,13 the
practice of tailoring law to fit the particular corporation persists. The law does not treat
all corporations similarly but rather frequently takes into account key, relevant
differences when regulating corporate entities. Part II.B will set forth examples of this
practice.
The variety that marks the corporate undertakings, coupled with the practice of
treating different types of corporations differently, suggests that for First Amendment
purposes, not all corporations should be treated similarly.
A.

CorporateDiversity Over Time

In this Part, I shall review the prevailing historical conceptualizations of the
corporation. I shall commence with the conceptualization that dominates our present
era (the contractarian model of the corporation), and thereafter march back in time to
explore those theories that came before it. This review is instructive for at least two
important reasons.
First, much is to be learned from the insights of past generations regarding the
corporation. Although these insights were gleaned in different times and under different
circumstances, I suggest that they are far from irrelevant. To the extent that these
insights go to features or characteristics that may mark certain corporate enterprises in
our own time, these insights possess continued vitality and usefulness.
Second, it is good to remember that understandings and theories can and do
change over time. Normatively, I add that such evolution can be a wise and good
thing--especially when it is the result of changing realities and circumstances. This is a
particularly important recollection as we confront the vexing question of corporate
political speech. For if it seems as though the recognition of corporate political speech
does not square with our prevailing understanding of the corporation, we have at least
two (and not simply one) potential responses. The first (and most common) response is
to reject the recognition of corporate political speech. The second is to reconsider our
understanding of the corporation.
I.

The Contractarian Era

Most scholars who think and write about corporate law today conceive of the
corporation as a "nexus of contracts." 4 Grounded in the principles of economics, this
conceptualization envisions the firm "not as an entity, but as an aggregate of various
inputs acting together to produce goods or services." 5 These inputs are bound together
by a network of "explicit and implicit contracts," which serve to structure and define

13. See infra Part II.A.1 for a discussion on the "nexus-of-contacts" conception of corporations.
14. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND EcoNOMICS § 1.5, at 27, 33 (2002).
Important early works advancing the nexus-of-contracts approach include Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972),
Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcON. 288 (1980), and Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviors, Agency Costs, and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976). These in turn built upon the work of Ronald Coase in The Nature ofthe
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) and The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
15. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 27.
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roles, responsibilities, and relationships within the firm.16 To contractarians, the
primary purpose of corporate law is to provide a set of efficiency-maximizing, off-theshelf default rules to govern the firm.17
The original impetus for the contractarian approach was, largely, a desire to more
accurately capture the relationship between corporate shareholders and management."
This was itself fueled by a growing mistrust of managers and disenchantment with the
"managerialist" understanding of the firm, 19 which had long been controversial.20 As
P.M. Vasudev explains, the approach helped address these and other dominant
concerns that had been growing since the 1960s:
*
decisive managerial power in American corporations, coupled with
shareholder passivism;
*
growth strategies pursued by managers that delivered little value to
shareholders;
*
stagnant share prices and the inability of investors to derive capital
gains from their shareholding;
*
emerging hostility to economic regulation and an emphasis on
market freedom; and
*
the rise of the law and economics movement and the sidelining of
non-economic considerations in policymaking.?'
The contractarian approach was made possible by the work of Armen A. Alchian
& Harold Demsetz and Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling who published (in
1972 and 1976, respectively) articles applying microeconomic thinking to intrafirm
activity. 22 (Heretofore, microeconomists had shied away from examining intrafirm
activity within the "black box" of the corporation, allowing managerialism to reign
supreme without serious competition for decades. 23)
The microeconomic examination of the firm revealed that intrafirm interactions
could be characterized as not even differing "in the slightest degree, from ordinary
market contracting between any two people." 24 As such, each actor within the firm can

16.

Id.

17. Id. at 29-31.
18. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74
CORNELL L. REv. 407, 410 (1989) ("[C]ontractual pictures better account for many aspects of relationships
between corporate managers and security holders than do competing managerialist pictures."); Fama, supra
note 15, at 288-89 (stating that the relationship between security owners and management can be explained
within the "set of contracts" perspective).
19. See infra Part II.B. I for discussion of the managerialist view of the corporation.
20. See Bratton, supra note 18, at 413-15 (describing the debate between "anti-managerialists" and "promanagerialists").
21. P.M. Vasudev, Law, Economics, and Beyond: A Case for Retheorizing the Business Corporation,55
McGILL L.J. 911, 919 (2010).
22. See Bratton, supra note 18, at 415 (describing the history of contractarian view of the corporation
that challenged traditional notions of management).
23. See id (describing how the papers published by these economists marked the advent of a new
economic theory challenging traditional notions of management interaction).
24. Id. (quoting Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 777).
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be expected to rationally pursue the maximization of his or her self-interest. 25
Relationships within the firm, including rights and responsibilities, could all be
interpreted in that light, thereby providing a means by which to formulate default rules
of corporate law. 26 The emphasis on market contracting implies voluntarism, which
undermines the managerialist view of a coercive corporate hierarchy. 27
The contractarian theory of the firm can also be said to represent the product of
"unmitigated liberal individualism"-a philosophy that arguably has dominated
political and academic discourse since World War 11.28 This philosophical pedigree
contributed to its success-by conceiving the firm as a contentless "nexus,"
contractarians maximize individual autonomy and undercut arguments supportive of
state regulation. 29 This approach found a particularly welcome audience in the closing
decades of the twentieth century, given the deregulatory spirit of America in the 1980s
and 1990s.30 It also benefitted from the ascendency of the general law and economics
movement, of which it was a part .31
Another reason for the theory's success is its comportment with reality. As
William Bratton has explained, for all its faults and limitations, the contractarian theory
of the firm does indeed offer a "theoretical exploration" of certain "discrete aspects of
practical corporate relations." 32 It helps account for the fact that different investors
have different expectations, and "begins to explain the strains of corporate doctrine that
persistently refuse to apply the fiduciary principle."33
Importantly, the contractarian account is consistent with the enabling nature of
modem corporate statutes, and especially the ability of corporate actors to (usually)
deviate from these as they see fit. 34 When coupled with the ability to incorporate in any
state, and have that state's corporate law govern the corporation's internal affairs, even
the few "mandatory" aspects of corporate law take on a discretionary feel. 3 5 This lends
support to the view that the corporation is not a product of the state, but rather a
product of private agreement.36
25. Id. at 417, 422-23.
26. Id. 417-19 (discussing how agency costs explain a number of arrangements between corporate
parties).
27. See id. at 453-54 ("[o]nce corporate relationships are conceived as fully voluntary, a different picture
of the corporate hierarchy emerges").
28. See Bratton, supra note 18, at 439-40,457-58.
29. See id. at 439-40 (arguing that giving individuals in corporation autonomy to pursue self-interested
outcomes allows institutions to function without "deliberate design by higher powers").
30. Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance: A
ComparativeAnalysis, 7 HASTINGS BuS. L. J. 309, 335 (2011).

31. See Vasudev, supra note 21, at 923-24 (describing the rise of the law and economics movement and
its impact).
32. Bratton, supra note 18, at 461.
33. Id.
34. See Melvin Avon Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1486
(1989) (explaining that corporate statutes are often altered by firms in their charters or bylaws).
35. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-

Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1990) (describing the various ways in which corporations can
avoid certain rules and regulations),
36. See id.
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Perhaps the most significant example of this flexibility is one concerning a
bedrock principle of corporate law: fiduciary duty. It is black-letter law that corporate
officers and directors are bound by fiduciary duties to serve their corporations loyally
and with due care. Nevertheless, in conformity with contractarian thought, Delaware
corporate law was amended to permit firms to opt out of the director duty of care in
response to a controversial judicial decision in 1985 that aggressively construed the
duty.37
Whereas the dominant characteristic of the precontractarian firm was the
separation of ownership from control,38 arguably this has been replaced by a separation
39
of "ownership from ownership" via the ascendancy of institutional investing.
Although scholars have yet to link the development and acceptance of the contractarian
model with institutional investing, perhaps there is some connection between these
developments. By way of initial observation, for example, the attenuation of ownership
through multiple intermediaries (including mutual funds, hedge funds, and pension
funds4 0) might lend support to the idea that the corporation is not a "thing" capable of
being "owned" (a common contractarian critique of property-based models of the
firm 41) but rather a legal construct created via contract. As the human element becomes
further removed from the corporation, it becomes easier, I suggest, to view the
corporation as a mere abstraction.
At the same time, the advent of institutional investors counteracts the dispersion
of individual investors that had been the norm during the early twentieth century.42
This cuts against the "managerialist" model of the corporation as an institution operated
by a largely unchecked management team.43
Finally, it can be said that the contractarian model "drew affirmation from the
market and the constant rise in share prices" since its general acceptance in the 1980s
(a confluence that continued until the financial crisis of 2007)."
Since the corporation lacks owners per se, one might wonder about the role of
shareholders under the contractarian conceptualization. Contractarians assert that
although shareholders do not own the firm,4 5 they are nevertheless treated like owners
under corporate law because they have bargained for (or should be deemed to have

37. Id. at 4 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864 (Del. 1985)) ("Among other reactions to
this case, the Delaware Corporation law, followed by other state statutes, was amended to permit charter
amendments opting out of the director duty of care.").
38. See infra note 59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Berle and Means' idea of the separation
of ownership from control in the modern corporation.
39. See generally Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from

Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822 (2011).
40. See id. at 1830-36.
41. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 28.
42. See Michael R. Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 79 GEO.

WASH. L. REV. 161, 181-82 (2010) (noting that institutional investors now own the majority of outstanding
stock in American corporations).
43. See infra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the managerialist view of the corporation.
44. Vasudev, supra note 21, at 914.
45. Cf id. at 916 (explaining the view that concentrated power among directors undermines the
ownership rights of shareholders).
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bargained for) ownership-like rights in the corporation.4 6
As a corollary to this (although not a necessary one), contractarians also generally
posit that the corporation is to be managed pursuant to the goal of shareholder wealth
maximization. 47 That is, the directors and officers of the corporation are bound, via
fiduciary duty, to manage the corporation with an eye toward maximizing shareholder
wealth. 48 This shareholder wealth maximization objective, in turn, is viewed as part and
parcel of the "shareholder primacy norm," which holds, more broadly, that the
corporation is to be governed according to the best interests of its shareholders.4 9
2.

Managerialism

Before the contractarian view of the corporation burst onto the scene, serious
inquiry into the nature of the corporation had been fairly dormant for about fifty
years. 50 Indeed, it could be said that, influenced by the "pragmatic instrumentalism" of
John Dewey, the dominant mood of corporate scholarship during twentieth century
America was "antitheoretical." 5' Pursuant to this utilitarian approach, corporate law
was not deduced from a larger theoretical construct, but rather driven by
consequentialist concerns. 52
"Managerialism" best characterizes the dominant understanding of the corporation
during this antitheoretical phase.53 For during this phase, it was incontrovertible that
professionalized, salaried corporate management dominated American business
corporations. 54 And this development had been relatively new. Prior to the twentieth
century, corporations were generally smaller, and still often governed by their
owners. 5 Although many years in the making, it is no small coincidence that Adolph
Berle and Gardiner Means' famous treatise The Modern Corporation and Private

Property, which highlighted the separation of ownership from control as the defining

46. See id. at 918 (discussing how governance and operational issues are determined by contractual
methods).
47. See Jackson, supra note 30, at 336-37 (noting shareholders' incentive to ensure management
maximizes firm wealth).
48. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 408-10 (contrasting the theory of shareholder wealth
maximization with stakeholderism). But see Lyman Johnson, Corporate Law Professors as Gatekeepers, 6 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 447, 450 (2009) ("no law requires that businesses pursue only the goal of corporate profit or
the goal of investor wealth maximization"); Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability,and
a New Paradigmfor Corporate Governance, 94 IOwA L. REV. 987, 1007 (2009) (finding that socially
responsible business practices can be consistent with shareholder wealth maximization).
49. Jackson, supra note 30, at 334. But see Ronald J. Colombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling
Traditional and Progressive Corporate Law via an Aristotelian Understandingof Ownership, 34 J. CORP. L.
247, 267-68 (2008) (arguing that, under an Aristotelian account of ownership, shareholder primacy does not

necessarily entail shareholder wealth maximization).
50. See Michael J. Phillips, Reappraisingthe Real Entity Theory of the Corporation,21 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 1061, 1070 (1994).

51. Id. at 1070, 1074-76.
52. See id. at 1073-77.
53. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectivesfrom
History,41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1475-76 (1989).

54. Id. at 1475-76, 1487-88
55. See id. at 1485-87.
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characteristic of the modem corporation, made its appearance in 1932.56
Although it was clear to all that management dominated the corporation, this
descriptive account was not a normatively justifiable one to many.57 A number of
scholars questioned whether management's domination was legitimate, charging that
management was operating "without accountability."58 As discussed, this, in part,
accounts for the warm reception that the contractarian model when it appeared in the
closing decades of the twentieth century.
3.

Natural Entity Theory

"Natural entity theory" was the most recent genuine philosophical
conceptualization of the corporation to precede the nexus-of-contracts model.59
Pursuant to this conceptualization, the corporation is not simply a mere legal fiction,
but a genuine article-"a being with attributes not found among the humans who are its
components."60 The corporation is thought to be a naturally occurring entitysometimes even described as an "organism." 6' It is seen as a natural outgrowth of
human conduct-the product of "the natural activities of private individuals." 62 Natural
entity theory was made possible by two developments: the promulgation of general
incorporation statutes (which, in a break from past practice, enabled the formation of a
corporation via the filing of routine paperwork with one's state), and the rise of "large,
management-dominated corporations." 63
General incorporation statutes sounded the death knell of concession theory-the
notion that corporations are creations of the state." Whereas in years past corporations
were chartered on a case-by-case basis, with some scrutiny into their purposes and
designs, by the late eighteen hundreds nearly anyone in good standing could
incorporate any legitimate business by simply completing and filing the requisite
forms.65 To the natural entity theorist, the state's issuance of a license to do business as
a corporation (following the firm's filing of its articles of incorporation) is not
altogether different than the state's issuance of a birth certificate (following the parents'
submission of the appropriate documentation). In both cases, the state merely

56. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).

57. See Bratton, supra note 53, at 1476 (discussing the anti-managerialist view that management did not
legitimately hold power over the corporation).
58. E.g., id.
59. See Phillips, supra note 50, at 1067-70 (noting that the real entity theory of corporations preceded
the nexus-of-contracts theory). Separating the two theories was the "antitheoretical" period of corporate law
(best referred to as "managerialism") that consumed most of the twentieth century. See supra Part I.A. I. for a
discussion of the nexus-of-contracts theory.
60. Id. at 1068.
61. Id. at 1068-69.
62. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 211. Perhaps this view was best
captured by Howard Laski, who described the corporation as a "real entity" possessing a "personality that is
self-created." Harold Laski, The PersonalityofAssociations, 29 HARv. L. REV. 404, 413 (1916).
63. Phillips, supra note 50, at 1067-70.
64. See infra Part II.A.5 for a discussion of concession theory.
65. See infra Part II.A.5 for a brief discussion of the evolution of the corporate chartering process.
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recognizes the newly formed entity-it does not create it by concession or otherwise. 66
As Edward Younkins explained: "Acorporation is created by, owned by, and operated
by a freely constituted group of individuals. The state merely recognizes and records
the formation of corporations-it does not bring them into existence."67
The rise of a class of professional-corporate managers made clear that the
corporation was no longer simply a partnership-like association of businesspeople (as
"aggregation theory" would hold68 ). It was something different-a sui generis entity
whose whole was greater than the sum of its parts. 69 For the corporation "can be
substantively distinguished from its owners, managers and employees by its capacity to
express independent moral judgments."70 That is, through the process of its internal
decision-making mechanisms, the corporation can come to a decision that no particular
individual would subscribe to individually. And even without the rise of the managerial
class, there are certain "qualitative changes people undergo after they enter groups."7'
This, by itself, suggests that the corporation is more than simply an aggregation of
72
individuals, as it takes on a certain spirit of its own.
Natural entity theory had important implications for corporate law-many of
which worked to decrease the role and reach of state regulation. 73 The ultra vires
doctrine (the doctrine that certain corporate acts exceeded corporate authority) largely
withered away during the real entity era, for this doctrine was predicated on the notion
74
that "corporations lacked any powers beyond those conferred by the legislature."
Similarly, corporations were at one time limited to conducting business within the
states of their incorporation under the theory that "corporations could have no power
where that law [of their state of incorporation] ceases to operate." This too fell by the
wayside during the natural entity era.75 By 1910, a business incorporated in one state
could conduct business in any other state, reflecting the view that "corporations were

66. See Arthur Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality,21 HARv. L. REv. 253, 261 (1911) ("A corporation
exists as an objectively real entity, which any well-developed child or normal man must perceive: the law
merely recognizes and gives legal effect to the existence of this entity."); Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations
are People Too: A Multi-DimensionalApproach to the CorporatePersonhoodPuzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 97, 112-13 (2009) (finding that a corporation's existence does not rely on the state's recognition of
the corporation).
67. Edward W. Younkins, Morality and CharacterDevelopment: The Roles of Capitalism, Commerce,
and the Corporation,4 J.MARKETS & MORALiTY 94, 101 (2001).
68. See infra Part II.A.4 for a discussion of aggregation theory.
69. See Brian M. McCall, The Corporationas Imperfect Society, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 509, 529-35 (2011)
(discussing the historical evolution of modem corporations from the universitas,which was viewed as a whole
transcending its members); Millon, supra note 62, at 216 (discussing the theory that corporations as entities
exist apart from its ownership).
70. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate CriminalLiability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 833,
848 (2000).
71. Phillips, supranote 50, at 1108.
72. See id at 1108-11 (arguing that the corporation's attributes differ than those of individuals possessed
prior to joining the firm).
73. See Millon, supra note 62, at 211-12 (identifying the changing role and reach of state regulations of
corporations).
74. Id
75. Id.
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76
creations of private initiative, rather than artificial products of state action." And, as
one might expect, the reach of state regulation over corporations was generally pruned
back during the natural entity era, and corporations began to increasingly enjoy the
rights and status of natural persons, "eliminating the many special limitations on
77
corporate freedom of action that the states had imposed in the past." In short, the
78
corporation was viewed as more of a private entity than a public one.
Even the hallmark corporate characteristic of limited liability received explanation
and justification from natural entity theory. For if a corporation is seen as an entity
distinct from the individuals constituting it, treating it separately and independently for
79
purposes of liability strikes a more sensible chord.
In America, natural entity theory prevailed only briefly-from the late eighteen
hundreds to the early nineteen hundreds-sandwiched between managerialism and
aggregation theory.80 The "pragmatic instrumentalism" that took hold of the American
academy by the 1920s sounded the death knell of serious corporate theory, effectively
killing the natural entity conceptualization. 8' Nevertheless, the theory certainly left an
enduring mark on corporate law, ushering in changes that remain in effect long after
the theory's demise. 82

4.

Aggregation Theory

An important bridge between the foundational concession theory of the
corporation83 and natural entity theory just discussed is "aggregation theory," which
84
flourished fleetingly during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Under the
aggregation theory, the corporation is neither a state concession nor a separate entityrather, it is simply "an association of individuals contracting with each other" in order
to do business together.85 Although in its early manifestations this theory focused
almost exclusively on the corporation's investors (thereby treating the corporation
essentially as a partnership), later manifestations pulled into the "aggregation" other

76. Id. at 212-13.
77. Id. at 213.
78. Id.
79. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close CorporationsReconsidered,63 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1157-58 (1989)
(finding that the corporation's independence from its members was "significant to the development of limited
liability").
80. Phillips, supra note 50, at 1068-70. See infra Part II.A.4 for a discussion of aggregation theory.
Such is not the case in Europe, where real entity theories of the corporation have a very rich history and
lingering vitality as well. I JOHN P. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS 242-44 (1905).
81. See supra Part H.A.2 for a discussion of the antitheoretical view of corporations during the twentieth
century.
82. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the influence the natural entity
theory had on corporate law.
83. See infra Part II.A.5 for an analysis of the concession theory of corporations.
84. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A Legal/ContractualistCritique,46 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 27, 55 (2009).
85. Id. (quoting Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations,
15 DEL. J.CORP. L. 283, 293 (1990)).
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corporate constituencies as well.86
Although aggregation theory had been articulated by some early in the nineteenth
century, its climb to prominence began during the years of the Jackson Presidency.87
As already indicated, traditionally corporations were created by specific legislative
grants from the state.88 The democratization of this process began in earnest during the
Jacksonian era, during which a drive was made "to make the general business
corporation available to all Americans." 89 As a result, the practice of case-by-case
incorporation via specific legislative grants began to be replaced by statutes of general
incorporation. 90 Pursuant to these laws, pretty much any person or persons could create
an incorporated business "without a special bill, simply by complying with the
statute." 91
Because of the spread of statutes of general incorporation, "corporations no longer
seemed a product of sovereign grace," and concession theory lost its hold. 92 A new
theory of the corporation was needed, and since "substantial identity still existed
between owners and managers" at this time, aggregation theory was a good fit.93
Under aggregation theory, the corporation was a legal fiction-a convenient
construct to account for the collective action of many private individuals marching
under the same banner. 94 Although aggregation theory toppled concession theory, its
reign as champion was short lived. The theory might have persisted longer, but for the
advent of a professionalized managerial class that came to control most American
corporations near the end of the nineteenth century.9 5 For with this development, "the
metaphor of a corporation as an aggregation of partners [had become] less intuitively
appealing than it had been in earlier years." 96
As such, the impact of aggregation theory on corporate law is difficult to assess.
In many ways, it was a transitional movement toward natural entity theory, and as such
can claim credit for much of that theory's achievements or contributions to corporate
law. 97 That is, the ideas that the corporation's powers should not be limited to those
granted by the state, that the corporation may do business in states outside of its state of

86. See id (highlighting aggregation theory's initial focus on shareholders then later expansion to other
individuals making up the corporation).
87. Id. at 55-56.
88. Id. at 54. See also supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the traditional notion
that corporations were created by specific legislative grants by the state.
89. Cupp, supra note 84, at 56 (quoting Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate "Person":A New Analytical
Approach to a FlawedMethod of ConstitutionalInterpretation,37 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 75 (2005)).

90. See id. (citing Krannich, supra note 89, at 75-76) (arguing that the movement towards general
incorporation statutes allowed for corporations to be seen as aggregations of individuals).
91. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 20-21 (2000).
92. Bratton, supra note 53, at 1485-86.
93. Id. at 1485.
94. See Cupp, supra note 84, at 55.
95. See id at 57 (highlighting the increased role of officers and directors, rather than shareholders, in
corporate decision making during this period).
96. Id.

97. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the contributions and achievements
of natural entity theory on corporate law.
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incorporation, and that the corporation should be recognized as a rights-bearing
institution-all of these are furthered by the aggregation theory's eclipse of concession
theory.98
Finally, it must be noted that aggregation theory has arguably been reprised in the
nexus of contract model of the corporation. Both view the corporation in "individualist,
contractualist" terms-as aggregations "formed by private contracting among its
human parts." 99 The primary distinction between the two would be aggregation
theory's general focus on shareholders (as akin to partners), versus contractarianism's
focus on relationships more broadly.
5.

Concession Theory

As already mentioned, "concession theory" describes the original understanding
of the corporation on American soil-an understanding that reigned supreme from
colonial times through the middle of the nineteenth century. 00 Pursuant to this
understanding, "the state was regarded as the creator and master of the corporation,
which was simply the servant of the superior will of the state."' 0
Concession theory fit well with the historical and factual realities of the
eighteenth-century corporation. Unlike their modem counterparts, corporations of that
time (and before) "were essentially state chartered monopolies for the pursuit of some
interest beneficial to the state."' 02 Hence, medieval corporations, and practically all
corporations up until the mid-nineteenth century, concerned themselves with
undertakings such as education, religion, colonization, foreign trade, bridge-building,
hospital maintenance, and other public-oriented activities.1 03 Corporations were
chartered by the crown (or, in America, by the state legislature) individually and
specifically.104 To achieve their ends, corporations were granted certain limited powers

98. See Michael B. Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, Seeing the Elephant: An Organizational Perspective on

Corporate Moral Agency, 33 AM. Bus. L. J. 489, 494-96 (1996) (noting that once incorporation became the
right of more than a select few, the state's control over corporations began to diminish).
99. Metzger & Dalton, supra note 98, at 495-96 (quoting Phillips, supra note 50, at 1065).
100. Liam Seamus O'Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personality of the

Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 201, 219-20 (2006).
101. Id. at 219.
102. Douglas Amer, Development of the American Law of Corporationsto 1832, 55 SMU L. REV. 23,

26 (2002). This is the case with regard to the British experience with corporations-an experience which was
exported to North America. Ronald J. Colombo, supra note 49, at 251-52. In contrast, the European
continental experience is a more complicated one, which has since ancient times included a strand of thought
that equated the corporation as a naturally occurring association of individuals. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The
Cyclical

Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective

on Corporate Social

Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 767, 780-82 (2005) (examining the work of Bartolus regarding ancient
European corporations as entities separate from the state and from its members).
103. See Amer, supra note 102, at 26 (explaining how corporations were subordinate institutions serving
national purposes); Colombo, supra note 49, at 251-52 (finding that early nineteenth-century corporations
were often established to promote a public purpose such as building banks, churches, or roads); McCall, supra
note 69, at 534-35 (describing the social and charitable nature of business entities such as guilds); Brian M.
McCall, UnprofitableLending: Modern CreditRegulation and the Lost Theory of Usury, 30 CARDOzo L. REV.

549, 599 (2008) (describing the nonbusiness activities of the large eighteenth-century corporations).
104. Amer, supra note 102, at 37; Colombo, supra note 49, at 251-52.
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and rights. 05
Naturally flowing from concession theory were several key aspects of corporate
law that have since fallen by the wayside. Since a corporation's existence was
dependent upon an exercise of the State's discretion, there was little basis upon which
to recognize corporate "rights." 06 Since both a corporation's purposes and the powers
it might employ to achieve its purposes were specifically delineated by the State, the
doctrine of ultra vires served as a powerful check on corporate activity. 0 7
As indicated, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the practice of authorizing
corporate charters on a case-by-case basis gave way to laws of general incorporation. 08
There were a number of reasons for this transition, including the growing demand to
conduct business in the corporate form, concerns over corruption associated with the
charter-granting process, and the democratic zeitgeist of the Jacksonian Era, which
pushed for greater and more equal access to the benefits of incorporation. 0 9
B.

Modern CorporateRegulatoryDiversity

A review of the unfolding of corporate conceptualizations over time has the effect
of marginalizing theories of the past. This is unfortunate because the insights of past
conceptualizations remain more relevant today than is commonly acknowledged. For
though past conceptualizations have certainly lost their once-held positions of
dominance, some of the realities that animated their appearance have not entirely
disappeared. In short, although the contractarian conceptualization may best describe
most corporations today, it does not as accurately describe them all. Contractarian's
dominance is justifiable; its monopoly is not.
Contracterianism fails to conceptually describe all modem corporations, which
can vary quite dramatically from one another.11 0 Corporations include entities as
diverse as Microsoft, the American Red Cross, the New York Times, the Episcopal
Diocese of Albany, the American Civil Liberties Union, the New Jersey Democratic
Party, and the Jet Quick Lube Corporation of Hempstead, NY."' Some are large and
international, others are small and local. Some are for-profit, others are not-for-profit.
Some are religiously oriented, others are politically oriented. Some are publicly traded,
others are closely held.
As a result, some of today's corporations are best understood in terms of past
105. See Amer, supra note 102, at 30 (listing certain "automatic incidents" inherent in the creation of a
corporation).
106. See Cupp, supra note 84, at 52 (describing the "artificial" nature of a corporation and detailing how
"it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it").
107. Millon, supra note 62, at 208. See supra note 78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
decline of the ultra vires doctrine.
108. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text for a discussion on the rise of general incorporation.
109. JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 2.01 at 32 (2d ed. 2003); Cupp, supra note
84, at 56.
110. See MICHAEL NOVAK, ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE CORPORATION AS IT OUGHT TO BE 4
(1997); Bucy, supra note 11, at 1123-27.
111. An independently owned automotive oil change facility on Long Island, N.Y., with a staff of one to
four employees. See Jet Quick Lube Corp, MANTA, http://www.manta.com/c/mmzlv73/jet-quick-lube-corp
(last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
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conceptualizations. A small family owned and operated corporation, for example,
would seem to be well described and understood under the aggregation theory of the
nineteenth century-not contractarianism. A large pension fund-and, perhaps, mutual
funds in general-might more accurately be envisioned in managerialist terms. A
holding company, existing solely on paper and lacking constitutive human members,
would appear to be the epitome of an artificial person-perhaps harkening back to
concession-theory ideas of the corporation. In sum, although it is certainly permissible
to adopt the contractarian model as the default conceptualization of the modem
corporation, I suggest that previous conceptualizations be retained and employed as
appropriate.
Fortunately, although academics and theoreticians have largely settled upon
contractarianism,11 2 lawmakers and regulators do not appear wedded to a universal
contractarian conceptualization of the corporation. As has become apparent to them,
the fact that a particular entity is a corporation is in many cases neither particularly
informative nor particularly noteworthy-other features and characteristics of the entity
are far more important depending on the context. Consequently, the manner in which
corporations are regulated largely reflects an appreciation of these salient distinctions.
What we see time and again is not the law's deference to some overarching
conceptualization of the corporation, but rather a tailoring of rules and regulations to
the particular business entity before it. In the pages that follow, a few important
examples of this practice are discussed.
1.

Corporate Law

Corporate law itself does not treat all corporations equally. Consider, for example,
one of the defining characteristics of the modern business corporation: limited
liability.113 Called "the greatest single discovery of modem times,"l 4 limited liability
permits a corporation's shareholders to partake in the upside potential of a business
venture while risking only the limited sum of their invested capital."t
Yet even this cornerstone of corporate law is not equally applicable across
corporations. Pursuant to the doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil," a corporation's
shareholders can be held liable for the debts of the corporation (beyond their total
investment amount) if certain features characterize the corporation." 6 These features
primarily include (1) a shareholder's (owner's) failure to observe corporate formalities,

112. Scholars who oppose the nexus-of-contracts model have proposed an alternative theory in its place.
E.g., Phillips,supra note 50, at 1063 (arguing in favor of the real entity theory).
113. See ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.1, at 2, § 1.2 at 7-10 (1986) (summarizing the benefits
provided by limited liability arrangements); Daniel J. Morrissey, Piercing All the Veils: Applying an
EstablishedDoctrine to a New Business Order, 32 J. CORP. L. 529, 534-36 (2007) (quoting Nicholas Murray
Butler, President, Columbia Univ., Address at the 143rd Annual Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce of the
State of New York (Nov. 16, 1911)) (tracing the historical context of limited liability).
114. Morrissey, supra note 113, at 534-35 (quoting Butler, supra note 113). Butler further explained that
"even the steam engine and electricity are far less important than the limited liability corporation and they
would be reduced to comparative impotence without it." Butler, supranote 113.
115. Morrissey, supra note 113, at 536.
116. See Cox & HAZEN, supra note 109, at 106-11 (describing several bases for piercing the corporate
veil).
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(2) a shareholder's (owner's) domination of corporate affairs, and (3) inadequate
corporate capitalization.' 17 When these features are present (and especially if they are
present in combination), courts may choose to discard the rule of limited liability and
hold shareholders accountable for a corporation's debts.118
The veil piercing doctrine does not appear consistent with a contractarian view of
the corporation, for a number of reasons.11 9 For example, veil piercing clings to the
notion that the corporation is a "thing" that is actually owned by somebody (the
shareholders). 120 It also reads into the corporate nexus contractual terms that are not
necessarily justifiably inferred. The heavy-handedness of this imposition harkens back,
I suggest, to the concession theory of the firm more than any other. Regardless of the
doctrine's propriety, however, the important point to be grasped is that veil piercing
handles different incorporated business entities differently. Veil piercing is an example
of the law's ability and practice to look beyond the mere nomenclature of a firm and
into its substantive characteristics in assessing how best to treat that firm.
Another common example is that of the "close corporation."l21 These entities
share little in common with most other, public corporations, even though they are
ordinarily incorporated under the same statutes of general incorporation.12 2 Most
significantly, close corporations "have only a small number (for example, fewer than
thirty) of individual shareholders and [their] shares are not traded on a recognized
securities exchange or on the over-the-counter market."1 23 This lack of liquidity,
coupled with the active management of the enterprise by its shareholders (which is
often the case), gives rise to a host of characteristics at odds with the prevailing
corporate paradigm. 124 In recognition of this, the law treats close corporations
differently than public corporations. 125 Not all the same corporate formalities need to
be observed, restrictions on share transferability are more likely to be enforced, and
even restrictions on director discretion have been upheld. 126 Although this is largely a
matter of case law, formal distinctions are also apparent in state codes as well. 127

117. See id (explaining how these three features manifest themselves in practice).
118. Id. at 104.
119. That said, to the extent that contractarianism is an offshoot of aggregation theory, veil piercing
could be conceptually justified. Simply put, veil piercing could be said to recognize the existence and
responsibility of real entities behind the non-entity of the contractarian corporation. See infra note 153 and
accompanying text for a description of the relationship between contractarianism and aggregation theory.
120. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing,26 J. CORP. L. 479, 515 (2001) (explaining
how veil piercing affects limited liability, and why veil piercing is inconsistent with contractarianism).
121. See Mitchell, supra note 79, at 1144.
122. CLARK, supra note 113, § 1.3, at 24-25.
123. Id. at 24.
124. See id. § 1.3, at 26 (noting that the "roles of investor and manager or employee" are often blurred in
close corporations).
125. See id at 28.

126. See id. §§ 18.1-18.2, at 763-84 (providing a detailed discussion of various restrictions imposed
upon close corporations).
127. Id. § 1.3, at 28.
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Securities Regulation

An important subset of corporate law, federal securities regulation, also
(repeatedly) takes into account the diversity that marks corporate entities.
Federal securities law distinguishes those corporations that are "public" (or
"reporting") from those that are "nonpublic" (or "nonreporting"), and significant
repercussions follow this categorization.12 8 Public companies are (subject to some
exceptions) those corporations that (a) have made a public offering of securities; (b)
have securities listed on a national stock exchange; or (c) have more than $10 million
in total assets and more than 500 equity shareholders.1 29 A public company is subject to
a panoply of disclosure requirements, including annual reports, quarterly reports, proxy
30
statements, and other reports triggered by the occurrence of certain specified events.1
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) distinguishes public from
nonpublic companies in recognition of their different cost sensitivities, and the
3
divergent needs of the investing public when it comes to such companies.' '
Corporations whose securities are not publicly traded, who have few securities holders
(less than 500), and who fall below the $10 million asset level are simply deemed (as a
matter of rough approximation) less capable of handling the cost and expense of the
law's mandatory disclosure regime. 3 2 Additionally, the informational needs of the
investing public with respect to such corporations are considered to be diminished.
An even more elaborate set of distinctions applies to issuers who wish to make a
public offering of securities. The SEC divides these corporations into four different
categories: (1) unreporting issuers, (2) unseasoned issuers, (3) seasoned issuers, and (4)
33
well-known seasoned issuers.
A host of repercussions follow an issuer's categorization within the scheme set
forth above.134 As one moves from the first category (unreporting issuers) to the fourth
(well-known seasoned issuers), one moves from corporations that are not publicly
13
traded, to corporations that are heavily capitalized capital-market veterans. s Along the
way, one discovers greater privileges and flexibility being afforded to the issuing
corporation in terms of required disclosures. 3 6 The logic behind this scheme is that the
128. Amy Deen Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran: How Reductive Standards of Materiality Excuse
Incomplete Disclosure Under the Securities Laws, 7 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 13, 20 (2011).
129. MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAw 476 (4th ed. 2007); Westbrook, supra note
128, at 20.

130. Westbrook, supra note 128, at 20-21.
131. Cf Relief from Reporting by Small Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-37157, 61 SEC Docket
2092 (May 1, 1996) (altering public securities regulation in order to shield smaller businesses from federal
securities regulations).
132. Cf id. (explaining that increasing the asset level for small businesses to ten million is still consistent
with investor protection).
133. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, Exchange Act Release No.
52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722,44,734 (Aug. 3, 2005).
134. See STEINBERG, supra note 129, at 117 (explaining some differences in SEC regulations based on a
corporation's categorization).
135. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, Exchange Act Release No.
52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722,44,734 (Aug. 3, 2005).
136. Id. at 44,726 n.40.
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investing public needs greater disclosure when it comes to the securities of poorlyknown companies, and lesser disclosure when it comes to the securities of well-known
companies. 137 Again we witness the law's ability and tendency to look beyond the mere
fact of incorporation, and predicate its impositions upon other characteristics (in this
case, social realities).
3.

Employment Law

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 famously prohibits any employer to
discriminate against any employee on the basis of race, sex, color, or national origin.' 38
Title VII defines an "employer" as:
[A] person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a corporation
wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or
any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to
procedures of the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of Title 5),
or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization)
which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title 26, except that
during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer than twenty139
five employees (and their agents) shall not be considered employers.
Observe how the definition turns not on whether the entity is incorporated or not,
but instead primarily upon the entity's size-"fifteen or more employees."l 40 Similarly,
when it comes to punitive damages, Title VII requires the courts to consider the size
and financial capacity of the defendant. 14 1 Further still, the Act places statutory caps on
the award of punitive damages based on the size of the employer in terms of its number
of employees.142 Thus, when it comes to employment law, a business's size is what
matters; the fact that a business may be incorporated or not is wholly irrelevant.143
4.

Formal Distinctions

Perhaps the most visible way in which corporations have come to be recognized
as differing from one another is via statutory categorization. Over the years, a
multiplicity of corporate variations have come to be recognized, and someone wishing
to incorporate an entity today has an ever-growing list of corporate forms to choose
from.
The most significant legally recognized distinction is that between for-profit and
137. Id. at 44,727.
138. Civil Rights Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e);

3C KEvIN F. O'MALLEY, ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTION 160 (5th ed. 2001).

139. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e(b) (2006).

140. Id.
141. 45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination§ 2661 (2012).

142. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
143. The same holds true with regard to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), the applicability of which turns on the size of the business in question, see 1
RONALD J. COOKE, ERISA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1:101 (2012).
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not-for-profit corporations. The fundamental difference between these two entities has
been well explained by Henry Hansmann:
The defining characteristic of a nonprofit organization is that it is
barred from distributing profits, or net earnings, to individuals who
exercise control over it, such as its directors, officers, or members.
This does not mean that a nonprofit organization is prohibited from
earning a profit. Rather, it is only the distribution of profits that is
prohibited; net income, if any, must be retained and devoted to the
purposes for which the organization was formed. Moreover, it is only
net income, or pure profits, that may not be distributed; nonprofits are
generally free to pay reasonable compensation to individuals,
including controlling individuals, for labor services or capital provided
to the organization.'"
Not surprisingly, therefore, the law treats nonprofit corporations differently than
for-profit corporations in many significant ways. 141 One obvious difference is the
ability of certain nonprofit corporations to avoid the payment of income taxes.14 6
Further variations in the types of corporations that can be created have been
promulgated, which in some ways blurs the traditional aforementioned distinction
between for-profit and not-for-profit. In New York State, for example, one can choose
to incorporate as a business corporation, a nonprofit corporation, a cooperative
corporation, a religious corporation, a transportation corporation, or (as of 2012) a
benefit corporation.14 7 And with each choice comes a particularized set of default (and
sometimes mandatory) governing rules.148 The choice is not carte blanche, of coursethe options available will depend upon the characteristics of the organization in
question. But this growing list of choices underscores the fact that for many
corporations, what they have in common (a shared corporate form) is less important
than what distinguishes them (e.g., their for-profit or not-for-profit nature).
1II.

CORPORATE PERSONHOOD AND RIGHTS

Having examined the nature of the corporation vis-A-vis society in Section II of
this Article, I shall now examine the nature of the corporation vis-A-vis the United

144. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit CorporationLaw, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 497, 501 (1981).

145. See id. at 501-08 (providing examples of unique legal treatment of nonprofit corporations).
146. 16 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

§

44.76.10 (Dennis Jensen &

Gail A. O'Gradney eds., 3d ed. 2003).
147. See Andrew Delmonte, New York State Senate and Assembly Pass Benefit CorporationLegislation,
BUFFALO RISING (June 28, 2011) http://www.buffalorising.com/2011/06/new-york-state-senate-and-assemblypass-benefit-corporation-legislation.html (describing legislation involving "benefit corporations" in New
York). See generally N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 201 (McKinney 2012); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §
201; N.Y. COOP. CORP. LAW § 13; N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW § 2; N.Y. TRANSP. CORP. LAW §§ 2, 3. Seven
states in total permit businesses to incorporate as "benefit corporations"-New York, New Jersey, Califomia,
Maryland, Vermont, Virginia, and Hawaii. Angus Loten, With New Law, Profits Take Back Seat, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 19, 2012, at Bl.
148. Compare N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW § 2 (providing the requirements to incorporate as a religious
corporation), with N.Y. TRANSP. CORP. LAW § 2 (providing the requirements to incorporate as a transportation
corporation).
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States Constitution. This sets the stage for Section IV, which will bring together these
natures, and consider them in light of the political philosophy of Alexis de Tocqueville.
A.

The Corporationas a Rights-BearingPerson

As discussed, changes in corporate theory have largely matched the evolving
realities of the corporation.149 (The most important inflection points along the way
would appear to be the advent of statutes of general incorporation (which spelled the
demise of concession theory), 50 and the separation of ownership from control (which
ushered in corporate law's modem era, marked by managerialism and
contractarianism) 151)
Proceeding simultaneously has been the advance of corporate constitutional
rights, and the related development of "corporate personhood."l 52 Curiously, however,
these two interrelated phenomena have not closely tracked the path that corporate
theory cut, nor the evolving realities of the corporate form. Instead, these two
interrelated phenomena have generally operated along their own trajectory, marching to
the beat of their own drums.' 53 In fact, for the most part, this development has been
untheorized, and unmoored to the reality (or understanding) of the corporation itself.
Corporate personhood refers to the fact that "the law conceives corporations to be
legal persons with certain powers and purposes." 54 One might expect the concept of
corporate personhood to manifest itself differently depending upon an era's overall
conceptualization of the corporation. For example, the apogee of corporate personhood
might logically be expected in the concession-theory era, when the corporation was
seen as nothing other than a legal fiction. On the other hand, one might expect the
concept of corporate personhood to be used for the sake of convenience in the periods
of aggregation theory, or its descendant, contractarianism, where there is simply an
aggregation of individuals.
Similarly, the apex of corporate personhood might logically be expected in the
149. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of changes in corporate theory.
150. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text for the historical context of general incorporation
statutes.
151. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the key characteristics of modem
corporations.
152. By corporate constitutional rights, I mean the courts' recognition of constitutional rights applicable
to corporations; by corporate personhood, I mean the courts' recognition of the corporation as a "person"
capable of possessing constitutional rights.
153. See David Graver, Comment, PersonalBodies: A CorporealTheory of CorporatePersonhood,6 U.

CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 235, 236 (1999) (providing an overview of the Court's jurisprudence on corporate
rights vis-i-vis corporate personhood). But see Stephen G. Wood & Brett G. Scharffs, Applicability of Human
Rights Standards to Private Corporations:An American Perspective, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. SuPP. 531, 540-41

(2002) (arguing that "the choice of theory affects the content and scope of rights and duties assigned to the
corporation"). I acknowledge that the way in which a corporation is theorized can influence the rights that are
granted to the corporation. Indeed, I believe that it should influence the question of rights. I observe, however,
that the historical linkage between theory and rights is a weak one at best. Thus, I disagree with Wood and
Scharffs' assertion that the "content and scope of the rights and duties of corporations have developed over the
years in response to evolving theoretical understandings of the nature of the corporate persona." Id. at 541.
154. CLARK, supra note 113, § 16.1, at 675. There are a number of issues with "corporate personality."
See id. at 675-76.
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real-entity era, when the corporation was seen as a naturally occurring feature of human
society. But this is not the case. As Michael Phillips has observed: "Historically, there
seem to be few clear links between the real entity theory and the emergence of
corporate legal rights."155 Generally speaking, the concept of corporate personhood has
grown steadily in robustness over time, despite the more checkered evolution of
corporation theory itself-including the abandonment of real-entity theory.
Given the movement away from real-entity theory into the managerialist era, to
the modern contractarian conceptualization, one might have expected the idea of
corporate personhood to wane. After all, the movement from a naturally-occurring real
entity, to an untheorized legal fiction, to the nothingness of a nexus, would suggest, I
posit, a move away from the personalization of the corporation-a move away from
notions of corporate personhood (and, concomitantly, corporate rights). But this is not
what happened. Instead, the robustness of corporate personhood has waxed largely
unabated.
Ironically, it was during the concession-theory era that the movement to recognize
corporate rights and personhood received its first substantial impetus in America. In
1819, Chief Justice Marshall penned the decision Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward'5 6 upholding the rights of corporations against the powers of the state. 57
The right in question in Dartmouth College was the simple right of a corporation to
enjoy its corporate charter free of postincorporation impairment by the very state that
had granted it.151 But this was a start. And with the exception of a brief detour in 1839,
when the Supreme Court declared that the corporation was not a "citizen" within the
meaning of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution,159 the growth in recognizing corporate
personhood and rights proceeded steadily.160
Perhaps influenced by the real entity theory of his time, in 1886 Chief Justice
Waite famously declared to counsel about to argue before the Court:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a
State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does.' 6'
I say "perhaps influenced" because the Court did not explain how it came to this
unanimous conclusion-neither from the bench nor in its opinion.162 And in the years
that followed, the explanations that were forthcoming were both meager and unclear.163

155. Phillips, supra note 50, at 1098.
156. 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
157. Woodward, 17 U.S. at 650.

158. Id. at 624.
159. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 520 (1839) (explaining that a corporation has "no legal
existence" outside the state of incorporation); see also Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate
Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REv. 1629, 1636-37 (2011) (explaining the gradual movement from the

corporation as an artificial being to its current status as a natural person).
160. For an excellent catalogue of corporate rights, constitutional and otherwise, see Wood & Scharffs,
supranote 153, at 547-65.
161. Santa Clara Co. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
162. Pollman, supra note 159, at 1644.
163. See id. at 1645-46 (explaining that although Santa Clara was affirmed as precedent in other cases,

24

TEMPLE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 85

To the extent that a consistent line of reasoning can be discerned, one could say that the
Court recognized corporate personhood (and, with it, certain rights) out of a concern
over the property rights of corporate shareholders. 1
Perhaps discernment of this Santa Clarareasoning holds the key to understanding
why corporate theory, and corporate rights, proceeded along different paths. Whereas
the changes in corporate theory were pegged to changing corporate realities, changes in
the Court's treatment of the corporation were pegged primarily to changing
understandings of the U.S. Constitution.165 For the period of ascendency for corporate
rights occurred within the same period during which the Supreme Court increasingly
read the U.S. Constitution to protect economic rights and interests generally. 166 This
development need not be, and apparently was not, related to the realities of the
corporate form or the nuances of corporate theory.
This explanation would also help illuminate why the advance of corporate rights
and personhood continued throughout the managerial era-a time when corporate
theorizing was basically dormant.'67 As Elizabeth Pollman explains, "the twentieth
century staged a significant expansion of corporate rights beyond this [economic]
context," but without articulating "a coherent concept of corporate personhood."' 68
And although, during the first half of the managerial era, the Supreme Court would
occasionally make mention of corporate theory in its decisions regarding corporate
rights, by 1960 the Supreme Court avoided such discussions altogether. 169 By 1960, it
had become quite clear that the Court's focus was on the Constitution and the particular
constitutional right in question-not on corporate theory.170 This focus is quite clear in
the Supreme Court decision at the heart of this Article: Citizens United.
Citizens United concerned a challenge to the McCain-Feingold Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the Act).' 7' The Act, in relevant part, prohibited a
corporation from using its general treasury funds to engage in "electioneering
communication" within thirty days of a primary election, or sixty days of a general
election.172 In a five-four decision authored by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court
struck down that portion of the Act.173 Nowhere in the decision does Justice Kennedy
invoke a conceptualization of the corporation, or address the nature of the corporation.
Instead, his analysis focuses solely on the First Amendment to the Constitution.174

its reasoning was never fully analyzed).
164. Id.

165. See TRIBE, supra note 10, at 567-74 (discussing the Lochner era of Constitutional interpretation).
166. Id.
167. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the managerial era.
168. Pollman, supra note 159, at 1647.
169. See Graver, supra note 153, at 240 (pointing out that since 1960, the Supreme Court has stopped
theorizing about corporations altogether).
170. See Elizabeth Salisbury Warren, The Casefor Applying the Eighth Amendment to Corporations,49
VAND. L. REV. 1313, 1320 (1996) (noting that in 1960 the Court stopped addressing corporate personhood and
instead focused solely on the amendment that spawned the constitutional issue).
171. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
172. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).
173. Id. at 917.
174. See id. at 896-97 (discussing principles underlying the First Amendment and citing laws found to
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Simply put, the Court finds that Congress has no power to regulate political speechregardless of the speaker.175
The lengthy dissent, authored by Justice Stevens, argued in favor of the Act's
validity on a number of grounds. 76 Stevens, however, not only failed to invoke a
conceptualizion of the corporation, but explicitly disavowed the importance of theory
altogether: "Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is conceptualized
as a grantee of a state concession, . . . a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, . . . a
mediated hierarchy of stakeholders, . . . or any other recognized model."' 77 Thus, in

Citizens United, we are treated to a discussion of the First Amendment's application to
corporations, entirely devoid of any serious analysis of the theoretical nature of
corporations.
Observing that a segment of the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence
rests upon an undertheorized conceptualization of the corporation does not necessarily
call into question the wisdom or validity of that jurisprudence. 78 For corporate law and
constitutional law are two distinct fields. The outer limits of what the Constitution
enables corporations to do or enjoy need not be coterminous with the privileges and
rights afforded to corporations under their state charters. Indeed, it should not be. For
the focus of constitutional law is on the powers and limitations of the U.S. federal
government. By contrast, state corporate law focuses on the fundamental powers and
structure of a private entity-the corporation. 179
That said, corporate powers not heretofore recognized under the U.S. Constitution
invite the reexamination of state corporate law. As such, the breadth of corporate free
speech rights articulated in Citizens United invites us to reconsider the degree to which
state corporate law facilitates the ability of corporations to engage in political speech.
Now that federal limitations on such speech are largely off the table,180 it is incumbent
upon state lawmakers to weigh the merits of allowing incorporated entities to operate

be unconstitutional restrictions of speech).
175. See id at 899 (finding "no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the
Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers"). The Court simply assumes, without any
discussion, that corporations are capable of "speaking."
176. See id at 929-80 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing the
distinction between corporations and people as speakers and the need to prevent corporations from
undermining the self-government tradition of the United States).
177. Id. at 971 n.72 (citations omitted).
178. Of course, this argument can certainly be made. See, e.g., Katie J. Thoennes, Frankenstein
Incorporated The Rise of CorporatePower and Personhoodin the United States, 28 HAMLINE L. REv. 203,
229-32 (2005) (highlighting inconsistent interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment suggesting
constitutional protections should not be afforded to corporations).
179. Cox & HAZEN, supra note 109, at 31-36.
180. That said, some in Congress have pushed for legislation that would purportedly circumvent Citizens
United, and some have even called for a constitutional amendment to reverse the decision. See Dan Eggen, Did
Citizens United Ruling Create a Monster?, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2012, at A13 (describing grassroots efforts
aiming to amend the U.S. Constitution); Sam Favate, Udall: Amend the Constitution, Wipe Out Citizens
United, WSJ LAW BLOG (Nov. 2, 2011, 12:51 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/11/02/udall-goes-nuclearproposes-amendment-to-wipe-out-citizens-united/?blogid=14&post id=41182 (describing one U.S. Senator's
efforts to amend the U.S. Constitution and thereby reverse Citizens United).
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so unimpeded. 18' And it is at the state level that corporate theory and examination of
corporate realities ought to most heavily influence policymaking.
B.

Matching Rights with Theory

In light of the preceding, any attempt to evaluate the propriety of corporate free
speech rights should do so within the proper theoretical context. Given that the nexusof-contracts understanding of the corporation reigns supreme today, one would expect
82
reference to that conceptualization in weighing the merits of corporate free speech.'
83
Not surprisingly, this is what leading corporate scholars have done.
But, as previously discussed, the contractarian understanding does not accurately
describe every corporation currently in existence.1 84 Other, older conceptualizations are
sometimes a better fit, due to the particularities of a given corporate entity. This
suggests that we ought to evaluate the propriety of recognizing First Amendment
protections not simply within the context of the contractarian conceptualization, but
under each potential conceptualization. Once we have determined which
conceptualization(s) can justify the extension of free speech rights to the corporation,
we can then determine whether a given corporation should possess such rights by
simply determining which conceptualization best describes it.' 85
I suggest that the conceptualization which most justifies recognition of corporate
free speech rights is the aggregation theory. The remaining conceptualizations, in order
of decreasing justifiability, are as follows: real-entity theory, contractarian theory, and
concession theory.
Aggregation theory posits that the corporation is essentially an aggregation of
individuals-not unlike a partnership.' And there is little reason to suggest that the
unquestionable right to free speech possessed by individuals vanishes once these
individuals combine to form a partnership.' 87 The critical question concerns what
happens if this partnership decides to incorporate. If very little happens in terms of the
substantive reality of the entity-if the only change is "on paper" so to speak-it would

181. See supra note 8 for a description of ways states may restrict corporations' rights.
182. See supra note 14 for a description of early works advancing the nexus-of-contracts approach.
183. E.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United, Corporate Personhood, and Nexus of Contracts Theory,
(Jan.
21,
2010,
3:30
PM),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM

/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-united-corporate-personhood-and-nexus-of-contracts-theory.html.
184. See supra Part II.B for examples of corporations that are better understood under the aggregation,
managerialist, or concession theories.
185. This is, of course, directly contrary to the approach taken by the Supreme Court, which "rejects the
idea that different entities, including different types of corporate entities, can have different rights and different
roles in campaign finance." Frances R. Hill, Exempt Organizations in the 2008 Election: Will Wisconsin Right

to Life Bring Changes?, 19 U. FLA. J.IL. & PUB. POL'Y 271, 292 (2008). But, as discussed, the subject of our
inquiry is not rights afforded by the Constitution, but rather the justifiability of empowering corporations to
partake in those rights pursuant to state corporate law.
186. See supra Part II.A.4 for a discussion of the similarity between partnerships and aggregation
theory's perception of corporations.
187. See Carol R. Goforth,

"A Corporation Has No Soul"-Modern Corporations, Corporate

Governance, and Involvement In The Political Process, 47 Hous. L. REV. 617, 654 n.186 (2010) (arguing that
partnerships may actually further free speech interests for their individual members).
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seem as though this entity should not be stripped of its free-speech rights merely
because it filed articles of incorporation.' 88
Oftentimes, however, much does change after incorporation. Outside investors
may be added to the mix. With the ability to raise additional capital more easily,
89
corporations often expand in size, and outgrow their earlier management team.' These
changes suggest the inapplicability of the aggregation theory-and a segue to realentity theory.
For at this point, the enterprise takes on a character qualitatively different than
that of a partnership. The admixture of outside investors and professionalized
management transforms the entity into something other than an assemblage of
"partners." Roles and hierarchies develop, such that the enterprise can be said to take
on a life of its own.190
But just because the enterprise might now be considered a "real entity," it does
not ineluctably follow that the entity should be endowed with free speech rights. There
are many "real entities" in this world, from tadpoles to trees, none of which enjoy
constitutional rights or constitutional personhood.' 9' Nevertheless, the symbolism of
real-entity status is indeed suggestive of "drives and interests that the law might
sometimes be obligated to respect." 92 Thus, in assessing the relative strength of their
claims to constitutional rights, I would place those corporations best theorized as "real
entities" second on the list of rights-deserving corporate enterprises. Not as entitled to
rights in the same way as actual human beings are entitled when aggregated together,
but arguably entitled to rights as the natural, real product of human effort.
93
The remaining theories-contractarianism and concessionl -are distinctively
less supportive of free speech rights. For under such theories, the corporation is
explicitly a legal fiction.194 Moreover, it is either a legal fiction instituted to further

188. Some have suggested that the "mere" act of incorporation brings with it tremendous benefits and
advantages (such as the protections of limited liability), and that this justifies certain restrictions on a
corporation's constitutional rights. E.g., Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An
Approach to Regulation of CorporatePolitical Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 630-31 (1991).

But as Richard Epstein has pointed out, constitutional rights cannot be denied solely because an individual or
entity has lawfully availed himself, herself, or itself of legal rights and privileges. Richard A. Epstein, Citizens
United v. FEC: The ConstitutionalRight That Big CorporationsShould Have But Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 639, 647 (2011).
189. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close CorporationsReconsidered, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1189 (1989)
(suggesting that firms seeking large amounts of capital will be inclined to incorporate in order to retain
centralized control and attract large investments).
190. See Phillips, supra note 50, at 1067-68.
191. Cf Charles . Lugosi, If l Were a Corporation,Id Be a ConstitutionalPerson, Too, 10 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 427, 428 (2006) (questioning why a corporation acquires constitutional rights but an unborn child
does not).
192. Phillips, supra note 50, at 1097-98.
193. Managerialism is not considered because it is the absence of theory. See supra Part II.A.2 for an
analysis of managerialism. Moreover, corporations that can be described as fitting the managerialist model can
most likely be categorized under real-entity theory or contractarianism, depending on their specific
characteristics.
194. See supra Parts II.A.1 and II.A.5 for a discussion of viewpoints that see corporations as legal
fictions.
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public policy, as in the case of concession theory,' 95 or to further private profit, as is the
assumption under contractarianism.196 Given the role and purpose of freedom of speech
in our society, 97 neither conceptualization of the corporation provides a particularly
compelling basis upon which to recognize corporate free speech rights carte
blanche.198
In sum, those corporations that would be best characterized as aggregates or real
entities possess the strongest claim to the protections of the First Amendment. Those
for whom the contractarian or concessionary model serves as a better fit appear to hold
much weaker claims. As the question is one of propriety and wisdom, and not one of
constitutional right (for that was settled by Citizens United), state legislatures would be
the most appropriate bodies for making the distinctions needed to implement such a
dichotomy.199
The preceding survey of corporate free speech rights in light of the various
historical corporate theories was brief, but intentionally so. 200 This brevity is due to an
important observation made by Susanna Ripken regarding the nature of the modem
corporation. For whereas I have argued that no one conceptualization ought to
monopolize the field in terms of describing the modem business corporation, Ripken
has gone one step further, observing that we should eschew even pigeonholing
individual corporations into one of the theoretical boxes of corporate
conceptualization. 20 As Ripken explains, the modem corporate entity is an "incredibly
complex" institution with a "multi-faceted nature." 202 No one conceptualization does it

195. See Phillips, supra note 50, at 1064-65 (stating that during the early nineteenth century,
corporations were usually chartered so as to link them to some public purpose).
196. See id. at 1073 (arguing that under contractarianism, corporations can be seen as "rational utility
maximizers of economic theory").
197. See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of critiques of corporate free speech rooted in the values free
speech is intended to promote.
198. To the extent that the contractarian model is viewed as simply the modem manifestation of the
earlier aggregation-theory model, a different assessment may be in order. See supra Part II.A.4 for a
discussion of aggregation theory. For if a contractarian corporation is merely the aggregation of individuals via
contract, an argument could be made that such an entity is deserving of First Amendment rights along the very
same lines used to justify such rights within the context of aggregation-theory corporations. See supra notes
186-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of aggregation theory and corporate free speech theory. In this
Article, I am crediting contractarian rhetoric, which ordinarily resists efforts to "reify" the corporation, and
instead insists on its fictional, abstract nature. E.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of
FiduciaryDuties. A Response to the Anti-Contractarians,65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 3 n.1 (1990). This rhetoric, I
suggest, undermines claims to First Amendment rights.
199. A federal judicial role could be foreseen in protecting one state's determination in these matters
against another's, by recognizing a state's limitations on corporate speech as applicable to foreign corporations
(corporations chartered in another state). This would be an encroachment upon the internal affairs doctrine. See
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAw 8 (2d ed. 2009) (arguing the usefulness of the corporation's legal
personhood). However, such an encroachment would not be without precedent. See Jason S. Haller, The
Constitutionality of Outreach Statutes Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 37 SETON HALL L. REv. 597,

598 (2007).
200. I warmly invite and encourage others who are so interested to continue the project.
201. See Ripken, supra note 66, at 102-06 (explaining the legal, moral, organizational, psychological,
sociological, theological, and political theories of the corporation as a person).
202. Id. at 105.
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justice, but rather each "captures elements of truth." 203 Ripken's insights ring true, and
this limits the fruitfulness of ascertaining which conceptualizations support, versus
those that do not support, corporate free speech rights.
A superior approach would be, therefore, to proceed differently. Instead of
starting with one of the preexisting theoretical conceptualizations, I suggest we
construct a conceptualization, from the ground up, that would justify the application of
free speech rights. To the extent that a modem corporation can be accurately described
by this newly constructed conceptualization, it ought, a fortiori, to receive the
protections of the First Amendment as per Citizens United
Fortunately, our undertaking need not start from scratch. For there already exists a
theory of organizations and their proper role within a democratic republic. It is the
theory of "associations" as espoused by Alexis de Tocqueville. 204
IV.

THE CORPORATION AS A TOCQUEVILLIAN ASSOCIATION

The political theory of Alexis de Tocqueville furnishes us with a means by which
we can tether the free speech rights of the corporation with the corporation's theoretical
conceptualization. This Section shows how, by drawing upon our tradition of
conceptualizing the corporation differently depending upon historical realities and
factual circumstances, we can conceive of some corporations today as "Tocquevillian
Associations." Such corporations-and only such corporations-are fully deserving of
the free speech rights afforded to them by the Supreme Court in Citizens United.205
A.

Relevance of Tocqueville

Alexis de Tocqueville was a nineteenth-century French political theorist gifted
with "a genius of perception." 2o6 Fascinated with the apparent success of the United
States, during an era when Europe was struggling with concepts of democracy,
Tocqueville embarked upon a yearlong examination of America firsthand in 1831.207

203. Id. at 102.
204. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 3 (Henry Reeve trans., Bantam Books 2000)

(1835).
205. Although American courts have clearly and repeatedly recognized the rights of associations (be
they incorporated or unincorporated), this recognition has been undertheorized to say the least. E.g., Haitian
Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 422, 474 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (recognizing organization's First Amendment
rights), modifiedon othergrounds, 676 F.2d 1023 (1 lth Cir. 1980). Moreover, in many instances, courts have
recognized (either implicitly or explicitly) an association's assertion of such rights as simply a convenient
means by which the rights of the association's members may be recognized. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 459 (1958) ("The association . . . is but the medium through which its individual members seek to
make more effective the expression of their own views."). This Article does not attempt to justify the

recognition of associational rights in general, but rather uses Tocqueville's theory and insights to justify such
recognition under certain circumstances. In short, this Article represents a modest contribution to the effort to
"make some pre-legal cognitive peace with the phenomenon of the organization" as to enable an intelligible

consideration of "the question of its appropriate normative treatment." MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS,
AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 27 (1986).

206. Joseph Epstein, Introductionto TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 204, at xix.
207. See id. at xxvi-xxxii (describing Tocqueville's journey to America and the development of his
book).
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He met and mingled with Americans both high and low, and from these labors
produced his masterful, two-volume treatise: Democracy in America.208 His work
received near universal acclaim and has been widely heralded "for different reasons by
different generations" since. 209 In it, he attempted to understand the grand interplay of
human nature and self-government. 210 "Tocqueville has come to be viewed as the
political scientist par excellence, and sometimes, more grandly, as a political
philosopher, where he has often been ranked just behind Aristotle and Machiavelli as a
political thinker." 211
Tocqueville's observations and thought have had a profound effect on the subject
of his study: America. 212 In the legal field alone, the U.S. Supreme Court has cited to
Tocqueville thirty-five times; lower federal and state court citations number in the
hundreds. 213 And this is not the product of some bygone era, for these citations
continue to this very day,214 and Tocqueville remains "a fixture in contemporary
American political discourse. "215 In short, although the merits of Tocqueville's
thoughts are certainly open to debate, their relevance cannot be denied. 216
B.

Tocqueville's Theory ofAssociations

In Chapter 12 to Volume I of Democracy in America, Tocqueville introduces the
subject of associations. 217 He acknowledges a variety of reasons why associations are
formed, including the promotion of "public order, commerce, industry, morality, and
religion." 218 He adds that this variety results from the fact that "there is no end which
the human will, seconded by the collective exertion of individuals, despairs of
attaining." 219
In his study in this section, Tocqueville confines himself to associations of "the
political world." 220 This is apparent in his definition of association, which immediately

208. Id. at xxix-xxxi.
209. Id. at xxvii, xxxiii.
210. See id at xxxvii (explaining the intersection of political and sociological elements in Tocqueville's
work).
211. Id. at xxxvi.
212. Id. at xlii.
213. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (referring to
Tocqueville's observations of the United States judicial system under Article III); Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Tocqueville's observations regarding freedom of
religion in the United States). A search of LexisNexis or Westlaw databases of the federal courts for Alexis de
Tocqueville will return numerous results.
214. E.g., Libertarian Party ofN.C. v. State, 707 S.E.2d 199, 208 (N.C. 2011).
215. SHELDON S. WOLIN, TOCQUEVILLE BETWEEN Two WORLDS: THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL AND
THEORETICAL LIFE 3 (2001).
216. But see John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins ofthe Constitutional Right ofAssociation, 77 TENN. L.

REv. 485, 549-56 (2010) (discussing the inapplicability of Tocquevillian thought to twentieth-century
America).
217. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 204, at 218.

218. Id. at 219.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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follows: "An association consists simply in the public assent which a number of
individuals give to certain doctrines, and in the engagement which they contract to
promote the spread of those doctrines by their exertions." 221 By simply replacing the
term "doctrines" with the term "undertakings," we have a broader definition that could
be used to cover all associations, and not just political ones. Since Tocqueville
addresses nonpolitical associations in Volume 11,222 including, explicitly, commercial
associations, this revised definition is a justifiable one.
For much of Chapter 12, Tocqueville discusses the distinction between
associations that threaten society (as he sees in Europe) and associations that do not
threaten society (as he sees in America). 223 This difference lies chiefly in the wider
ideological gulfs that mark European society, along with the militant nature of
European associations during Tocqueville's time. 224 As such, this portion of
Tocqueville's remarks is largely inapplicable to the subject of this Article.
What is relevant in Chapter 12, for our purposes, is Tocqueville's justification of
associations. As will become quickly apparent, Tocqueville values associations for
important instrumental reasons. But he gives pride of place to reasons that are intrinsic,
calling the right to associate a "natural privilege of man." 225 Although he offers this
opinion within the context of his discussion of political associations, neither the
language nor logic of his expression suggests that it should be so limited:
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself, is
that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow-creatures, and of
acting in common with them. I am therefore led to conclude that the right of
association is almost as inalienable as the right of personal liberty. No
legislator can attack it without impairing the very foundations of society.226
In Chapters 5, 6, and 7 of the Second Book of Volume II,227 Tocqueville
expounds upon associations more generally, addressing those "formed in the civil life,
without reference to political objects." 228 Here he explicitly acknowledges (and
includes) among these associations "commercial and manufacturing companies, in
which all take part." 229 Thus, it is clear that business enterprises are covered in
Tocqueville's analysis to follow.
Tocqueville was struck by America's rich associational life. Although political
associations were manifold, Tocqueville contextualizes them by noting that they are but
"a single feature in the midst of the immense assemblage of associations" in the United
States. 230 As he puts it, "Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions,

221. Id.
222. See id. at 630-45 (discussing the role of public associations, their relationship to newspapers, and
their ties to civil associations).
223. See id. at 225-27.
224. Id

225. Id. at 224.
226. Id.
227. Volume I is contained in one book; Volume It is organized into four books.
228. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 204, at 630.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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constantly form associations." 231
Tocqueville immediately contrasts the American situation with that of the
European. In Europe at the time, almost every major undertaking was headed by the
government, or a "man of rank." 232 In America, by contrast, associations were often at
the helm of such ventures. 233 Tocqueville opined that this was due to the lack of an
aristocracy or powerful government in America, necessitating the use of associations to
get things done. 234 Individual Americans were, generally speaking, "independent and
feeble," whereas each European aristocrat "constitute[d] the head of a permanent and
compulsory association, composed of all those who are dependent upon him, or whom
235
he makes subservient to the execution of his designs."
Although Americans may not be as powerless, and European aristocrats as
powerful, now as they were in 1831, Tocqueville makes an important point of lasting
relevance. In almost any society, the rich and powerful enjoy the advantages of
association, as their extended network of patronage assures them a ready and willing
pool of supporters. This is so regardless of whether the society fosters associational
freedoms. The poor and the powerless, however, are oftentimes bereft of such
advantages. To replicate them, these individuals need the ability to join together and
form associations of their own. In a society where such ability is lacking-even an
otherwise democratic society-the unprivileged generally lack the ability to advance
their interests or fend for themselves. Indeed, it was this very democratic and
egalitarian impulse that led-in part-to the promulgation of statutes of general
incorporation. 236 The corporation in America was seen-at the time of Tocqueville-as
"a means to equalize otherwise unbalanced competing economic forces." 237
With regard to government and its expansion, the ascendency of the corporation
(and associations in general) provided an important check. For as some of
Tocqueville's contemporaries recognized, "the more enfeebled and incompetent the
citizens become, the more able and active the government ought to be rendered, in
238
order that society at large may execute what individuals can no longer accomplish."
Given the increasing complexity of modem society, and the fact that individuals are
"less and less able to produce, of [themselves] alone, the commonest necessaries of
life," Tocqueville foresaw that "the governing power will therefore perpetually
increase, and its every efforts will extend it every day."239 And this cycle, once begun,
is self-perpetuating, for the "more [government] stands in the place of associations, the

231. Id.
232. Id. at 630-31.

233. Id.
234. Id. at 631-32.
235. Id. at 631.
236. See Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors: Corporate

Speech and the Theory ofFree Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 246 (1998) (discussing the impact of
corporate activity on society as a whole). See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
development of statutes of incorporation.
237. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 236, at 252 (summarizing Tocqueville's thoughts about the
common purposes of associations).
238. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 204, at 632.
239. Id.
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more will individuals, losing the notion of combining together, require its
assistance." 240 Over the course of the twentieth century, economist and philosopher
Wilhelm Ropke saw this play out, observing that one of the critical "counterweights
against the accumulation" of state power was "private enterprise." 24 ' If we look more
closely, we can see that associations are able to serve as this important check on the
state for at least two reasons.
First, by enabling individuals to accomplish what they could not otherwise
accomplish alone, private associations limit the growth of the state. Private initiative,
242
effectuated via association, obviates, to a degree, the need for an expanding state.
This helps preserve an extended sphere of freedom for the individual-a sphere free of
state dominance. 24 3
2
Second, associations can serve as an effective bulwark against state power. 44
Although an individual might not be able to take on city hall, an association of
individuals certainly can. 245 As Frances Hill put it: "Without effective organizations,
individuals are left to confront government authority alone as isolated and atomized
individuals." 246 The Supreme Court itself has observed the "critical role" played by
247
associations as "critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State."
Indeed, Tocqueville saw France's despotism after the French Revolution as largely "the
result of the assertion that the only true civic relation was that of the individual and the
State." 248

240. Id. at 632-33. Cf Timur Kuran, The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and
Persistence, 53 AM. J. COMp. L. 785, 789-93 (2005) (observing that the ascendency of the corporation
historically accompanied the weakness of the state).
241. WILHELM ROPKE, A HUMANE ECONOMY: THE SOCIAL FRAMEWORK OF THE FREE MARKET 145
(Elizabeth Henderson trans., 3d ed. 1998). An important qualifier to this statement would be Ropke's concern
with offensive and unhealthy pluralism, whereby groups, including large business corporations, seek to use the

government to do their bidding at the expense of others. Id. at 144-45.
242. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 204, at 623-33 (discussing how citizens can band together through
associations in order to accomplish more than individually). This is consistent with modem ideas of civil
society, which "stress the public yet non-governmental character of civil society" as a "realm of social life
characterized by 'plural and particularistic identities."' James Fox, FourteenthAmendment Citizenship and the
Reconstruction-EraBlack Public Sphere, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1245, 1249 (2009) (quoting Nancy L. Rosenblum
& Robert C. Post, Introductionto CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 1, 3 (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C.

Post eds., 2002)).
243. See SEYMOUR DRESCHER, DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRACY 46 (1968) (discussing the relationship

between associations and self-government in warding off state power).
244. See WOLIN, supra note 215, at 235 (explaining how Tocqueville saw power controlled and

influenced by an array of autonomous institutions).
245. Cf Liam Seamus O'Melinn, The Sanctity ofAssociation: The Corporation and Individualism in
American Law, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 101, 165 (2000) ("When faced with the individual who neither belongs

to an approved [privileged] group nor has property to devote to a cause, American law has long given the same
answer: Go and associate with others so as to become a bigger person, a corporate person.").
246. Hill, supra note 185, at 288. See also Richard Brooks, Law and Civil Society in the United States,

Canada, Quebec, and the First Nations, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 1, 12-15 (1998) (arguing that "a tier of
institutions, midway between the individual and centralized government, is an important part of any civil
society").
247. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
248. O'Melinn, supra note 245, at 143. Arguably, under the ancien regime, this individual had a
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Associations also serve to temper the radical individualism that is so seared into
the American character. 249 For it is largely through associations that "[fleelings and
opinions are recruited, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is developed." 250
This, in turn, helps, in the words of one commentator on Tocqueville, to "generate a
complex and beneficial network of social norms" indispensible to a free nation. 251
Finally, Tocqueville discerns a connection between political associations and civil
associations. Indeed, he sees a "natural, and perhaps a necessary" linkage between the
two. 252 As he explains:
Certain men happen to have a common interest in some concern-either a
commercial undertaking is to be managed, or some speculation in
manufactures to be tried; they meet, they combine, and thus by degrees they
become familiar with the principle of association. The greater is the
multiplicity of small affairs, the more do men, even without knowing it,
acquire facility in prosecuting great undertakings in common. Civil
associations, therefore, facilitate political association ... 253
To Tocqueville, civil associations provide a training ground for participation in public
associations-and vice versa. 254
Not surprisingly, Tocqueville counsels against taking action adverse to
associations-even mere "civil associations." 255 For
[w]hen some kinds of associations are prohibited and others allowed, it is
difficult to distinguish the former from the latter, beforehand. In this state
of doubt men abstain from them altogether, and a sort of public opinion
passes current which tends to cause any association whatsoever to be
regarded as a bold and almost an illicit enterprise. 256
Most relevant to our purposes, Tocqueville adds to his admonishment:
It is therefore chimerical to suppose that the spirit of association, when it is
repressed on some one point, will nevertheless display the same vigor on all
others; and that if men be allowed to prosecute certain undertakings in
common, that is quite enough for them eagerly to set about them. When the

modicum of protection from the crown, in the form of a powerful mediating aristocracy and clergy. When such
badges of privilege are wiped away (as in post-Revolutionary France and in the United States), and society is
more equalized, there are fewer countervailing voices checking the state. See Redish & Wasserman, supra note
236, at 251 (explaining the benefits corporate expression could have on its recipients).
249. See O'Melinn, supra note 245, at 102-05 (introducing the argument that the American legal system
has traditionally protected groups as well as individuals).
250. TOCQUEVILLE, supranote 204, at 633.
251. John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's JurisprudenceofSocial
Discovery, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 485, 529 (2002) (explaining that associations help regulate social norms and
individuals' behavior without intervention from the state). Others have commented upon the importance of
associational life as well. E.g., Timothy L. Fort, The FirstMan and the Company Man: The Common Good,
Transcendence, and Mediating Institutions, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 391, 406 (1999). But see id. at 427 (discussing

the antipathy of Hobbes and Rousseau toward traditional associations as inhibitive of freedom and equality).
252. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 204, at 640.

253. Id.
254. Id
255. See id at 642.
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members of a community are allowed and accustomed to combine for all
purposes, they will combine as readily for the lesser as for the more
importance ones; but if they are only allowed to combine for small affairs,
they will be neither inclined nor able to effect it.257
In other words, the associational freedoms and the robustness of associational life are
interrelated. Curtailment of association rights, even to a limited degree, risks ripple
effects chilling associational activity in general.258
In sum, Tocqueville believed that associations were a "central and constitutive"
element of American democracy. 5 9 Moreover, as between civil and political
associations, "Tocqueville actually believed that civil associations provided a greater
benefit to a democratic society than political ones because they created civic energy
without generating the factional strife of political associations." 260 He cautioned that
"[g]ovemment should not be permitted to supervise or manage civil associations lest
their independent influence on society be diluted." 261
C.

Characteristicsofa Tocquevillian CorporateAssociation

Having set forth a summary of Tocqueville's theory of association, the remaining
task before us is to decide how to apply that theory to modem corporate enterprises.
For although Tocqueville explicitly included commercial associations in his analysis,
he certainly "was not writing about organizations controlled by unaccountable
managers and self-perpetuating boards." 262 What is needed, therefore, is an
identification of those characteristics essential to the Tocquevillian Association, so as
to enable us to determine which corporations ought to be categorized as such. Turning
on this categorization is the advisability and justifiability of corporate political speech
rights.
Perhaps the most important Tocquevillian insight (and a seemingly
counterintuitive one) is the irrelevance of an association's actual purpose to the
analysis. For Tocqueville observes that associations are created for a myriad of
purposes, and in his recognition of genuine associations he does not discriminate
among these purposes: "[Americans] have not only commercial and manufacturing
companies .

.

. but associations of a thousand other kinds-religious, moral, serious,

futile, extensive, or restricted, enormous or diminutive." 263
This suggests that the purpose of an association ought not be a factor in
257. Id. at 643.
258. This was the thrust of an op-ed jointly authored by the unusual bedfellows Greg Lebedev (chairman
of the Center for International Private Enterprise, an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) and John
Sweeney (chairman of the Solidarity Center, affiliate with the AFL-CIO). See Greg Lebedev & John Sweeney,
Op-Ed, On Free Association, Business and Labor Agree, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2010, at A19 (arguing that

strengthening freedom of association advances economic prosperity, stability, and democratic values).
259. McGinnis, supra note 251, at 533.
260. Id. at 534. This would include Madison's fear of political associations as "factions." See Inazu,
supra note 216, at 548-49 (explaining Tocqueville's belief, contrasted with Madison's, that associations would
not threaten governmental stability in America).
261. McGinnis, supra note 251, at 534.
262. Hill, supra note 185, at 289.
263. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 204, at 630.
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determining its rights. To assert this irrelevance conflicts with a long established divide
between commercial and noncommercial activity, between profit and nonprofit
corporations.2 64 Both the Supreme Court, and commentators, have made this
distinction. 265 Within the context of First Amendment jurisprudence, this distinction is
often linked to the "antidistortion" rationale for limiting the speech of corporations. 266
This rationale supports the restriction of corporate speech on the basis of the
"distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support
for the corporation's political ideas." 267 This rationale, however, and the broader
distinction between profit and nonprofit corporations, is premised upon two
questionable presuppositions.
The first presupposition is that commercial or for-profit associations (which are
ordinarily treated together) are wealthier than noncommercial or nonprofit associations
(which are also ordinarily treated together). This presupposition simply does not hold
true universally. Although commercial and for-profit enterprises may have more
resources than noncommercial and nonprofit enterprises as a general matter, the entire
thrust of this Article has been to move away from generalities. When one gets specific,
there are certainly nonprofit institutions (such as Harvard University, for example) that
dwarf the vast majority of for-profit commercial enterprises in terms of wealth and
resources.268 And as a legal matter, there is nothing restricting the profitability or
wealth of nonprofit institutions vis-i-vis for-profit businesses. 269 Indeed, the very
nomenclature of profit versus nonprofit is misleading, as both types of organizations
generally seek and obtain profitability. 270 The critical difference is that the profits of a
for-profit enterprise are distributed to others, whereas the profits of a nonprofit are put
back into the enterprise. 271
Moreover, to the extent that commercial/for-profit corporations enjoy an
advantage in terms of wealth and power, this suggests that they are excellent candidates

264. See Michael C. Dorf, The GoodSociety, Commerce, and the Rehnquist Court, 69 FORDHAM L. REv.
2161, 2163-64 (2001) (distinguishing the legal treatment of commercial and noncommercial activities).
265. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984) (theorizing that along the
spectrum of corporations "lies a broad range of human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims to
constitutional protection"); Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1259-64 (2011)
(discussing the blurred boundary between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors).
266. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 659-61 (1990) (recognizing the
governmental interest in preventing corporate influence in the political process).
267. Id. at 660.
268. Cf Jeff Trexler, Design Jurisprudenceand the Nonprofit Style, 14 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 321, 38283 (2002) (describing the ability of nonprofit organizations, including schools, to exploit their nonprofit
categorization).
269. Hansmann, supra note 144, at 501.
270. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980) (stating
that many nonprofits turn annual profits).
271. Hansmann, supra note 144, at 501. But even this can be misleading, as the line between the
distribution of profits, and the payment of exorbitant salaries, can sometimes differ little conceptually. E.g.,
Robyn Blumner, Aiding the Poor Shouldn't Make you Rich, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, at 5P;

Stephanie Strom, Lawmakers, Tightening Belts, Question Nonprofit Salaries, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, at
Al2.
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when it comes to serving as a check on government-a critical role of the association
in Tocquevillian thought. As Martin Redish and Howard Wasserman note, the ability to
check government requires "power, resources, and incentive . . . corporations generally

possess all three." 272 Thus, contrary to being a drawback, the wealth of for-profit
corporations supports their identification as Tocquevillian Associations.
That said, to the extent that wealth is related to size, distinctions based on wealth
are not entirely meritless from a Tocquevillian perspective. There is an argument,
suggested by the literature on associational theory, that large institutions are less
capable of serving as true associations, because the human brain has difficulty relating
to groups (in the enriching matter that we would expect of a Tocquevillian Association)
beyond a certain size. 273 Although the "optimal size" of a group for such purposes is
debatable, it appears to be "dramatically smaller than megastructures such as the
nation-state or the global corporation." 274 This suggests that, although Tocqueville did
not discriminate among associations when it came to questions of wealth, ceteribus
paribus, larger corporations have less persuasive a claim to categorization as
Tocquevillian Associations for reasons having to do with their size alone.275
The second presupposition behind the for-profit and nonprofit distinction displays
a more qualitative, and, for our purposes, more important concern. It has to do with the
nature of the for-profit/commercial enterprise, versus the nature of the
nonprofit/noncommercial enterprise.276 And this concern melds with another aspect of
the association that can be distilled from Tocqueville's writings: the extent to which an
association serves as a "mediating institution" (to apply a modern term to the
phenomenon Tocqueville describes). 27 7 Tocqueville believed that associations were
essential because, among other things, they provided a vehicle through which
"[fleelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is
developed." 278 In short, associations provide individuals with community-an essential

272. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 236, at 263. See also MICHAEL NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF
DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 178 (1982) ("Without the large private corporation, there would be one fewer
among the large private forces strong enough to check the growing ambitions of the administrative state.").
273. Fort, supra note 251, at 428-29 (arguing that evolutionary history makes small associations
optimal). Similarly (and analogously), Thomas Donaldson pointed out that smaller corporations could
generally claim moral agency more readily than larger corporations. THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIoNS &
MORALITY 31, 110-11 (1982).
274. Fort, supra note 251, at 429.
275. Exceptions would be possible to the extent that a large corporation is divided into smaller units. In
such situations, the individual units may lay claim to associational status, although the parent corporation
would not be so entitled. And beyond this, some very large corporations have apparently been able to generate
genuine communities despite their size. See Don Mayer, Community, Business Ethics, and Global Capitalism,
38 AM. Bus. L.J. 215 (2001) (discussing the interplay between corporations and communities); Keith O'Brien,
From Startup to Tech Titan, PR WEEK USA, Mar. 26, 2007, at 17-18 (discussing Google's efforts to create a
unique corporate culture in the midst of exponential growth).
276. See Rodrigues, supra note 265, at 1291-92 (discussing how the nondistribution constraint creates a
unique social identity and trust among participants ofnonprofits).
277. See Fort, supra note 251, at 430 (describing how mediating institutions provide a framework with
which members may shape their identities).
278. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 204, at 633.
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component of human flourishing. 279 As mediating institutions, associations serve the
manifold purposes of socialization, self-realization, and the inculcation of civic
republicanism. 280
In their examination of corporations, many commentators conclude that only
nonprofits embody this communitarian dimension. Drawing upon social identity
theory, Usha Rodrigues persuasively argues that "[n]onprofits can create a social
identity in association, which for-profit corporations cannot." 281 This is because of the
inability of nonprofits to distribute profits, and the distinctiveness of a nonprofit's
"values and practices in relation to ... comparable groups." 282 This helps nonprofits
carve out a distinctive kind of identity, from which those associated with it derive a
certain prestige and "psychic income." 283
Rodrigues recognizes that certain philanthropic for-profit corporations have
blurred the distinction between profit and nonprofit corporations (she identifies,
specifically, Starbucks and Whole Foods), yet maintains that the distinction persists. 284
It is here that I part company with Rodrigues, for I believe that there is a point at which
we might have a technical distinction but not a substantive difference. For many of
Rodrigues's very own arguments in support of nonprofit identity can and do apply to
certain for-profit companies as well. Rodrigues is unwilling to follow her own cogent
reasoning to its logical conclusion, and draws, I suggest, an unnecessary line in the
sand.
Mark Hager, similarly, argues in favor of a robust protection of associations and
their rights-yet would exclude from this protection for-profit business corporations. 285
He justifies this exclusion primarily due to his assertion that "[a] business corporation
is not essentially a collection of people, but rather, essentially a collection of
capital." 286 Hager recognizes the debatability of this assertion, and quickly works to
counter those who would attack it as "excessively simplistic." 287 In doing so, he argues
that "[t]he common bond among stockholders lies almost exclusively in their mutual
hope of profits" whereas the membership of other (nonprofit) associations is "typically
held together by a broader and more complex range of social interests and purposes:
political, educational, charitable, and fraternal, as well as economic." 288
Hager's critique of the corporation as a profit-obsessed automaton is a common
one. As Dan Greenwood puts it, the corporation is, by law, beholden to "the interests of
279. See Fort, supra note 251, at 406 (arguing that organizations provide a place for the individual to
learn that one's self is dependent upon associations with others); McGinnis, supra note 251, at 529 (describing
Tocqueville's view that free association fosters creation of diverse and useful networks of social norns).
280. Fort, supra note 251, at 405-06, 430.
281. Rodrigues, supra note 265, at 1320.
282. Id. at 1282 (quoting Blake E. Ashforth & Fred Mael, Social Identity and the Organization, ACAD.

MGMT. REv. 20, 24-25 (1989)).
283. Id. at 1284.
284. Id at 1259.
285. Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational "Real Entity" Theory,

50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 575, 648-50 (1989).
286. Id. at 650.
287. Id. at 650-51.
288. Id. at 651.

2012]

THE CORPORATIONAS A TOCQUEVILLIANASSOCIATION

39

a fictional creature called a shareholder that has no associations, economic incentives
or political views other than a desire to profit from its connection with this particular
corporation." 289 This ties in with Rodrigues's view that the presence of shareholders
constitutes an important distinguishing feature separating for-profit corporations from
nonprofit corporations. 290
Again, as a matter of general supposition, I challenge neither Greenwood nor
Hager's description. 291 I agree with Hager's assertion that nonprofit organizations
"display a rich and various associational and 'political' character rarely displayed
among stockholders in a corporation."2 92 That said, I seize upon Hager's use of the
qualifier "rarely." "Rarely" connotes that some corporations do indeed share in these
traits, hence my assertion that some corporations are deserving of First Amendment
protections. 293 The world of commercial/for-profit corporations is a heterogeneous one,
and we should be open to the fact that some of these enterprises will bear all the
significant hallmarks of a Tocquevillian Association. 294 Indeed, in the years since both
Hager and Greenwood's articles were written, some states have adopted benefit
corporation statutes, explicitly authorizing corporate boards to prioritize other
objectives-social objectives with a view toward the common good-over shareholder
profits. 295 And well before that, several states adopted corporate constituency statutes,
which allow managers to take into account the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders
(including employees) when making decisions." 296 Thus, although Hager and
289. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV.

995, 1033 (1998).
290. See Rodrigues, supra note 265, at 1267 (finding that the absence of shareholders for nonprofits
results in a lack of individuals within the organization who are incentivized to monitor the actions of
managers).
291. Although, as I and others have argued, the law does not necessarily compel a corporation to
maximize shareholder profits. E.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 408-10; Colombo, supra note 49, at 281;
Redish & Wasserman, supra note 236, at 237.
292. Hager, supra note 285, at 651.
293. Hager also makes the argument that for-profit associations are less deserving of First Amendment
rights due to the fact that they are not governed by the "one person, one vote" paradigm, but rather by the "one
share, one vote." Id at 652. This calls to mind the "fervor for democracy" that, during the Revolutionary Era,
"led some states to recognize the rights of churches only if they follow democratic internal decision making
processes." Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of the Right of Association,

35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 862 (2002). In short, it strikes me as Orwellian to deny people the right to
organize in the manner they see fit in the name of democracy and freedom.
294. Cf Graver, supra note 153, at 248-49 (recognizing critical differences among commercial
corporations, such that some ought to possess free speech rights while others should not).
295. See Max Abelson, The New Be Good Business: Albany Gives Birth to New York's Benefit

Corporation, N.Y. OBSERVER, (June 23, 2010, 12:56 AM), http://www.observer.com/2010106/the-new-begood-business-albany-gives-birth-to-new-yorks-benefit-corporation (describing New York's consideration of
creating benefit corporations). See supra note 147 for a list of states with "benefit corporation" statutes. Some
have suggested that the proliferation of such corporations is vitally needed. See Michael Troilo, Caritas in
Veritate, Hybrid Firms, and Institutional Arrangements, 14 J. MARKETS & MORALITY 23, 25-26 (2011)
(discussing Pope Benedict XVI's assertion that society needs to "create space in the market for actors who
'operate according to principles other than those of pure profit, without sacrificing the production of economic
value in the process' (quoting POPE BENEDICT XVI, CHARITY IN TRUSTH: CARITAS INVERITATE 37 (2009))).
296. Barbara J. Fick, The ChangingFace of the American Workplace, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 1, 7 (1998).
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Greenwood accurately describe the prevailing understanding of the corporation during
our times (and, perhaps, the prevailing nature of most corporations as well) their
description does not accurately describe each and every corporation.
Many corporations simply do not view themselves as the profit-maximizing
machines suggested above. As Lisa Fairfax has documented, companies increasingly
distance themselves from profit maximization, and instead stress their balanced
commitment to a variety of corporate stakeholders. 297 This, in turn, may have important
normative and behavioral effects. 298
Whole Foods, for example, is simply not wedded to shareholder profit
maximization. Its CEO, John Mackey, explicitly disavows the profit maximization
objective. 299 He acknowledges that this may very well be the objective of the
company's investors, but adds that it is not the objective of its other stakeholders.300
Under his leadership, Whole Foods strives to provide value to all its constituencies. 301
As for its shareholders, he bluntly puts it this way, "we 'hired' our original investors,
They didn't hire us." 302
The ability of a for-profit corporation to have an authentic "identity" is further
attested to by the scores of employees, investors, and customers who are often drawn to
a particular corporation because of its unique qualities. 303 Corporations have real and
distinct cultures-even values. 30 As such, they enable people to "self-realize by
297. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate
Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 676-78 (2006).
298. Id.
299. Rethinking the Social Responsibility ofBusiness, REASON, Oct. 2005, at 29, 29-30.
300. Id. at 30.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 31.
303. See Shiela M.J. Bonini, et al., The Trust Gap Between Consumers and Corporations, 2007
McKINSEY Q. 6, 7-8 (finding that consumers "expect large companies to address sociopolitical problems, such
as climate change and the affordability of drugs in developing countries"); Redish & Wasserman, supra note
236, at 254 (arguing that associating with corporations provides a venue for self-realization); 2007 CONE
CAUSE

EVOLUTION

&

ENVIRONMENT

SURVEY,

CONE

Comm.

3

(2007),

available

at

http://www.coneinc.com/files/2007ConeSurveyReport.pdf (revealing that "over time, Americans have become
more likely to consider a company's reputation when making purchase, employment, and investment
decisions."); IMPACT INVESTMENTS: AN EMERGING ASSET CLASS, J.P. MORGAN 5 (2010) (finding that impact

investment offers a new alternative for funneling large sums of private capital into social endeavors);
Lawrence Glickman & Steven E. Livingston, Whole Foods Boycott: The Long View, WASH. POST (Sept. 2,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/shortstack/2009/09/wholefoods boycott the
5:30
AM)
2009,
longv.htnl?hpid=news-col-blog (describing how boycotts are used by consumers to force companies to be
more socially and environmentally responsible); Nicholas Timmons, Impact Investment "A Burgeoning Asset
Class", FIN. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2010, 6:02 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/e875dda6-fae6-lldf-b57600144feab49a (stating that impact investment allows investors to have a positive social impact); Raphael
Bemporad, How Conscious Consumers Are Redefining Value in a New Economy, CASE FOUND. (Apr. 23,
http://www.casefoundation.org/blog/how-conscious-consumers-are-redefining-value-new-economy2009),
8701 (stating that a significant amount of consumers make choices about which products to buy based on the
social and environmental reputations of companies); Benefits of Becoming a Sustainable Business, EcoOFFICIENCY.COM, http://www.eco-officiency.com/benefitsbecomingsustainable _business.html (last visited
Oct. 28, 2012) (finding that consumers are more attracted to companies who are socially and environmentally
conscious).
304. See Redish & Wasserman, supra note 236, at 237 (emphasizing that corporations are not merely

2012]

THE CORPORATIONAS A TOCQUEVILLIANASSOCIATION

41

engaging and investing in business and by participating in and personally benefitting
from the political-economic system through the power of collective action." 305
And as organizational scholars have pointed out, different corporations have
"distinctive cultures." 30 6 Indeed, not even all large, for-profit business corporations can
justifiably be lumped together as essentially identical. "It is not true that all big
companies are the same-they aren't .

. .

. Companies develop their own distinctive

personality and ethos which is so ingrained, so much a part of them, that the corporate
identity expresses itself in their every action." 307
A variation of the identity-based line of distinction between profits and nonprofits
argues that the message conveyed by associating with a for-profit versus a nonprofit
organization differs substantially. The Supreme Court captured this distinction well in
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,308 where it
explained that "[i]ndividuals who contribute to [a politically-oriented nonprofit] are
fully aware of its political purposes, and in fact contribute precisely because they
support those purposes." 309 The Court expressly contrasted this with the for-profit
world, where an individual's investment or employment decision was characterized
only as "for economic gain." 310 This theme recurs in the Supreme Court's "expressive
association" jurisprudence, most famously in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, where she explicitly excludes those organizations that
are predominantly "commercial" from the expressive association categorization.311
Such a view is, again, overly simplistic. As Evelyn Brody points out, "[m]any
organizations" (be they profit or nonprofit) "have multiple purposes," and as such
individuals belong to them for a variety of reasons. 312 To this, John McGinnis adds that
"faceless, robotic profit maximizers," but rather perform an "important democratic function in facilitating the
personal self-realization" of stakeholders).
305. Id at 254. See also Stephen F. Copp, A Theology of Incorporationwith Limited Liability, 14 J.

MARKETS & MORALITY 35, 41 (2011) ("The idea of human flourishing is often more associated with voluntary
associations ... but should be extended to business.").
306. Bucy, supra note 11, at 1123-27.
307. Id at 1123 (quoting WALLY OLINs, THE CORPORATE PERSONALITY 82 (1978)).
308. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
309. Mass. Citizensfor Life, 479 U.S. at 260-61.
310. Id. at 260.
311. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634-35 (1984). The Supreme Court's "expressive
association" jurisprudence serves to protect the autonomy of organizations that exist for the purpose of
engaging in protected First Amendment expression. See Erica Goldberg, Amending Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez: ProtectingExpressive Association as an Independent Right in a Limited Public Forum, 16 TEX. J.

C.L. & C.R. 129, 133-34 (2011) (stating that the expressive association category "safeguards group members'
ability to associate with each other in order to engage in protected expression"). An interesting question, and
one which overlaps with the inquiry of this Article, is whether certain for-profit corporations should be entitled
to recognition as expressive associations (notwithstanding Justice O'Connor's opinion). Randall P. Bezanson,
Sheila A. Bentzem, and C. Michael Judd address this question in Mapping the Forms of Expressive
Association, 40 PEPP. L. REv. (forthcoming Dec. 2012). They conclude that "in the modem business
corporation the associational claim should not be recognized at all." Id. at 25. For the reasons substantially
similar to those set forth in this Article, I disagree with their conclusion, and believe that whether or not a
particular business corporation qualifies as an expressive association ought to be decided upon a case-by-case
basis, and not subject to a blanket prohibition.
312. Brody, supranote 293, at 863-64.
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"[a]s society becomes wealthier, the distinction between what many people do for a
living and what they do to express themselves blurs." 313 The decision to invest in, work
for, or patronize a given business corporation may be (for some individuals) as political
as it is economic.314 Significantly, in an age when people are working longer hours than
ever before, when technology largely obliterates the distinction between on and off
duty, 3 s when substantial leisure time is in shorter supply, mundane employment and
consumer choices may very well be one of the few realistic and effective avenues that
the individual has nowadays to express himself or herself. And although not every
employee of a particular corporation may agree with all that corporation's political
speech, not every donor to a political advocacy group necessarily agrees with
everything the group advocates.3 1 6 Neither should undercut the entity's claim to an
identity."
Indeed, a substantial body of scholarship exists affirming the for-profit
corporation's ability to serve as a genuine association. Timothy Fort, for example,
laments the fact that the business corporation has been "neglected" as a mediating
institution in society.318 He lists five reasons why business corporations should act and
be treated as mediating institutions:
First, if being in such an institution assists in moral formation and identity,
then it simply is a good thing to do regardless of whether it is good business.
Second, since so much of a person's waking hours are in business work, the
corporation provides an opportunity to develop moral behavior. Third, some
scholars have argued that business demands time from employees that once
was available for traditional mediating institutions like the family,
neighborhood, and voluntary organizations. One then could argue that an
obligation in this "takeover" is the obligation to be a mediating institution.
Fourth, a mediating institution which is primarily concerned with the
development of its internal members might have a corporate analogue that is
efficacious if internal "stakeholders" have priority in corporate social
responsibility. Fifth, many businesses and business strategies depend upon a

313. McGinnis, supra note 251, at 538 n.268.
314. As Justice Douglas remarked: "Joining is one method of expression." Lathrop v. Donohue, 367
U.S. 820, 882 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
315. Olivera Perkins, Smartphones Let You Take Work Anywhere . .. That's a Problem: Mobility Blurs
Lines Between Workplace, Home, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, July 27, 2009, at Al.

316. See Redish & Wasserman, supra note 236, at 272-73.
317. Interestingly, perhaps Rodriguez and Hager's adulation of the nonprofit corporation leads them to
support a free-speech regime that is actually overinclusive. Recent scholarship on the nature and governance of
nonprofits suggests that not all is wonderful in the land of the noncommercial enterprise. See Brody, supra
note 293, at 859-61 (stating that the donor's voice can "uniquely trump all others"). The existence of powerfil
patrons, for example, can belie idealized notions of community and voice. See id. ("If the donor imposes a
particular charitable purpose on a charitable trust, and the purpose fails, the courts may apply cy pres doctrine
to reform the trust to as close a purpose as possible to the original"). As such, I do not believe that nonprofits
should get a free pass when it comes to the First Amendment, but rather ought to be evaluated according to the
same criteria used to evaluate for-profit corporations. That said, I find it unlikely that many nonprofits would
fail to pass muster as deserving of free-speech rights under such an evaluation, but in principle I suggest that
they ought to be subject to evaluation nonetheless.
318. Fort, supra note 251, at 433-34.
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319
notion of a business that is acting very much like a mediating institution.
He is not alone in this regard. "Business ethicists have suggested that corporations
320
Indeed,
today can, and possibly must, serve as mediating institutions in society."
"[t]o the extent that so many people spend most of their day working in or interacting
with corporate organizations, 'the corporation represents a value-laden institution that
outranks the local community as a focus of loyalty and a medium for selfrealization.' 321As Michael Novak explains:

The business corporation is . . . a "mediating structure," that is, a social

institution larger than the individuals who make it up, but smaller than the
state. An institution both voluntary and private, it stands between the
individual and the state and is, perhaps (after the family), the crucial
institution of civil society.3 22
Novak has gone so far as to develop what can rightly be called a "theology of the
corporation." 323 Building on Aristotle's observation that human beings are "social
animals," who can only flourish in a community, 324 Novak sees the modem business
corporation as providing that community. 325 He calls the corporation "a magnificent
social invention, prior in its existence to the modem nation-state," 326 the importance of
which has increased given the growth of the state, 327 and the decline of other mediating
institutions. 328 Indeed, the demands of work today are such that it is unrealistic to
expect people to develop their character and personalities entirely outside the
workplace.3 2 9 "For many of us, the two most important institutions in our lives are our
families and the organizations for which we work." 330 And for many if not most
people, the workplace is a corporation. It certainly is true that not every corporation
lives up to the lofty role that Fort and Novak define for it. But, with equal certainty,
some do.
Finally, another mark of a Tocquevillian Association is that it is a combination of

319. Fort, supra note 251, at 434 (footnotes omitted).
320. Ripken, supra note 66, at 146 (citing Timothy L. Fort, Business as Mediating Institution, 6 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 149, 151, 155-57 (1996)).
321. Id. at 146 (quoting Norton E. Long, The Corporations,Its Satellites, and the Local Community, in
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 202, 202 (Edward Mason ed., 1959)).
322. MICHAEL NOVAK, THREE INONE 233 (Edward W. Younkins ed., 2001).
323. MICHAEL NOVAK, TOWARD ATHEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION 33 (1990).
324. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 6 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1999) (remarking that a "social instinct is
implanted in all men by nature"); Richard J, Regan, Virtue, Religion, and Civic Culture, 13 MIDWEST STUD.
PHILOS. 342, 343 (1988) (discussing Aristotle as one of a few ancient philosophers that rejected the idea that
individualism is the "measure of all things" without regard to community).
325. See NOVAK, supra note 322, at 23 (finding that various social organisms like business enterprises
and corporations have supplemented familial loyalty).
326. MICHAEL NOVAK, THE FUTURE OF THE CORPORATION 5 (1996).
327. NOVAK, supra note 272, at 178 (1982).
328. See Ripken, supranote 66, at 153 (describing the views of Stephen Long and Timothy Fort).
329. See id. ("Work consumes too much time for one to think that virtuous habits are only cultivated in
some separate cultural sphere and then brought to the corporation." (quoting D. Stephen Long, Corporations
and the Common Good, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 77, 98 (2006))).
330. Id. (quoting Michael Naughton, The Corporation as a Community of Work: Understanding the
Firm Within the CatholicSocial Tradition, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 33, 40-41 (2006)).
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"individuals."331 The natural right of association that Tocqueville recognizes lays in the
fundamental human activity of "combining [one's] exertions with those of his fellowcreatures, and of acting in common with them." 332
As elementary as this particular characteristic may seem, it actually does serve to
establish some important parameters. For there do exist many corporations that are
merely paper entities. This would include, for example, certain holding companies,
which serve as mere shells established for the sole purpose of evading or enjoying
certain legal prescriptions,333 along with certain investment vehicles, which are little
more than automated trading accounts. 334 Such would not be associations under
Tocqueville's theory, and therefore undeserving of First Amendment rights.
In sum, it would appear as though a Tocquevillian Association would be marked
by (1) an assemblage of individuals, (2) a manageable size, and (3) a clear identity. The
corporation's objectives, along with its profitability and wealth per se, should not
factor into the determination.335 Corporations bearing these characteristics should be
afforded the fullest level of First Amendment rights and protections recognized by
Citizens United,for all the reasons identified by Tocqueville and others.336
Not coincidentally, these same characteristics are reminiscent of both the real
entity and aggregation models of the corporation--each of which were found
supportive of corporate free speech rights. 337 And this is because under each of these
conceptualizations we have an institution that is predominantly human (versus
predominantly artificial). Under each conceptualization, the corporation is envisioned
not as some state-created artifice, or some imaginary construct, but a genuine article
created for the fulfillment of authentic collective human needs and aspirations-"a
community of people voluntarily working together for common and/or compatible
goals and having, in varying degrees, shared values and concerns." 338

331. See supratext accompanying note 221 for a definition of a Tocquevillian Association.
332. TOCQUEVILLE, supranote 204, at 224.
333. Dean Kalant, Who's In Charge Here?: Requiring More Transparency In Corporate America:
Advancements In Beneficial Ownership For Privately Held Companies, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1049, 1053

n.19 (2009).
334. See Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman & Carla G. Teodoro, Forming, Organizing and Operating a
Mutual Fund-Legal and Practical Considerations, in THE ABCS OF MUTUAL FUNDS (PLI Corp. Law &

Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 18809, 2009), WL 1744 PLI/CoRP 35 (explaining the example of
mutual funds as remote trading accounts for investors); Jacob Preiserowicz, Note, The New Regulatory Regime
for Hedge Funds: Has the SEC Gone Down the Wrong Path?, 11FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 807-14 (2006)
(describing the structure and nature of hedge funds); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory ofAmerican Corporate
Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 10, 10-12 (1991) (reviewing the structure of financial investment and banking
institutions).
335. See supra Part IV.C for a discussion of characteristics of a Tocquevillian Corporate Association.
336. This is analogous to the conclusion reached by Thomas Donaldson in his consideration of moral
agency. Donaldson, supra note 273, at 30. He predicates the granting of corporate rights upon the existence of
moral agency, and in so doing observed that due to their diversity, not all corporations would qualify as moral
agents (and as such not all corporations should enjoy constitutional rights and protections). Id.
337. See supra Part 1IL.A for discussion of the corporation being viewed as a rights-bearing person.
338. Younkins, supra note 67, at 101-02.
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IMPLEMENTATION

Arguably, identifying the characteristics of a Tocquevillian Association in order
to categorize corporations into one theoretical camp or the other is the easy part. Far
more difficult is to settle upon some mechanism by which this identification process
can be undertaken in reality. In this brief section, I shall outline four potential ways in
which this could be done:
The most ambitious approach would be for state legislatures to set forth
parameters (keyed to the distinguishing characteristics of the Tocquevillian Corporate
Association: individuals, size, and identity) that, if met, would enable an incorporated
entity to robustly avail itself of the free speech rights enunciated in Citizens United.339
A corporation applying for such treatment would have to make a showing before an
applicable state agency that it indeed falls within the necessary parameters, and the
agency would grant or deny the application depending upon the strength of this
showing. 34 o The most significant feature of the showing would be the existence of a
genuine corporate identity and community-something more robust than the platitudes
that mark virtually every business organization today. 341 At a minimum, one would
expect the corporation's values and commitments to be articulated, with a degree of
detail, in the corporation's charter or articles of incorporation. The inclusion of such
language would require shareholder approval-but the necessary showing should,
ideally, also reflect buy-in from other corporate constituencies as well. An employee
vote, and even some form of customer certification, would go a long way toward
establishing the authenticity and credibility of a corporation's claims of association.
Alternatively, state corporate law could promulgate default rules that restrict
corporate political spending absent an "opt-in" by the corporation. This opt-in could be
via the traditional mechanism of a shareholder amendment to the corporate charterbut, as per the previous suggestion, it could, perhaps, also contain a requirement that
the opt-in be approved by other members of the corporate community as well. Such an
approach has the advantage of simplicity and clarity. It also removes the state from
case-by-case decision making, a process that is subject to corruption and
manipulation.34 2 It also permits corporations to define their own roles in the political
process-an advantage or disadvantage depending upon one's perspective.

339. 1 have chosen my words carefully here, because it remains an open question (in my mind at least)
whether state legislatures can completely undo Citizens United via revisions to their statutes of general
incorporation. See supra note 8 for discussion of state government power to restrict the constitutional rights of
corporations. That said, it would seem as though state legislatures could certainly chip away at the freedoms
ushered in by Citizens United, at least at the margins, hence the relevancy of this particular suggestion. Id.
340. This is analogous to a solution proposed by Richard Brooks in his analysis of the nonprofit sector,
and its ability to furnish society with mediating institutions. See Brooks, supra note 246, at 30-34. After
surveying the diversity of nonprofits, Brooks concluded that "[p]erhaps what is needed is a more careful
delineation of non-profits along the lines of the classification of mediating institutions according to principles.
. . . Each should then be treated differently depending upon its respective [classification]." Id. at 34.
341. Cf Fairfax, supra note 297, at 678 (explaining that the emergence of stakeholder rhetoric in
opposition to the profit-maximization norm has an intrinsic value).
342. Indeed, one of the reasons that statutes of general incorporation supplanted the granting of
corporate charters on a case-by-case basis was to avoid such very corruption. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara
Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985).
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Without state action, corporate political speech could be reined in via the passage
of disabling amendments to corporate charters-amendments, brought by investors,
stripping corporations of their rights to exercise free speech.3 43 Naturally, investors
desirous of their corporation's participation in the political process would prescind
from such amendments. 3
Finally, and perhaps least likely and least advisable, courts could wade into this
thicket. Courts could attempt to utilize the principles of Tocquevillian Associations set
forth above to guide their interpretation of "speech" as per Citizens United as future
cases anse.
VI. CONCLUSION

Citizens United makes very good sense if limited to those corporations that are
accurately described as Tocquevillian Associations. It makes poor sense if applied to
corporations generally. As such, Citizens United is both a step forward and a step
backward. Efforts to reverse or roll back Citizens United are laudable insofar as they
are restricted to those corporations that do not qualify as Tocquevillian Associations.
Recognition of the Tocquevillian Corporate Association would admittedly
complicate, rather than simplify, corporate jurisprudence And another layer of
complexity to anything is rarely welcomed. But I advert, again, to Susanna Ripken,
who wrote,
[w]e should adopt a more nuanced, multi-faceted, and perhaps 'messier'
model of the corporation, and we should do so not with a sigh of resignation
or defeat in that we could not compose a more neat and tidy theory . . . but

with a satisfaction in knowing that the complex nature of corporations
deserves no less. 345
Lastly, it is important to bear in mind the fundamental purpose of this effort to
justify corporate political speech on the part of certain corporations. It is not,
ultimately, to bestow rights and privileges upon the corporation for the sake of the
corporation per se, but rather for the sake of the individual persons who constitute the

343. Interestingly, data on corporate political speech tend to support this dichotomy. For it has been
found that firms where "an entrepreneur or founding family" remains actively involved, whether privately held
or publicly traded, "are more likely to contribute to independent political organizations in the first place, and
once they do contribute, give a far greater amount relative to firms without a principal owner [present]." Susan
Clark Muntean, Corporate Independent Spending in the Post-BCRA to Pre-Citizens United Era, 13 Bus. &

POL. 1, 1 (2011). 1see the presence of such overpowering individuals as a rough marker of identity-evidence
of an animating "vision" versus a sterile mission statement forged by someone long forgotten. With such
identity would naturally come a greater willingness to engage the political process, and a lesser sense that it
was anyway inappropriate.
344. There is evidence that American corporation management is already conforming its policies
regarding political spending to the appetite of corporate shareholders. See Kenneth P. Doyle, Companies Seen
Moving Toward Disclosure On Their Own After Citizens United Ruling, 80 U.S.L.W. 610 (Nov. 8, 2011)

(finding that most of the top 100 publicly traded companies "are moving toward voluntary disclosure of their
corporate political spending, and nearly a third of them also place some limits on how much they spend on
politics").
345. Ripken, supra note 66, at 174. See also DAN-COHEN, supra note 205, at 26 (criticizing as "great

oversimplification[s]" past conceptualizations of the corporation).
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corporation. 346 And that critically important point is all too often overlooked. When we
properly vindicate the rights of corporations, we serve to effectuate the rights of fleshand-blood human beings who freely choose to associate with those corporationsincluding investors, managers, directors, employees, suppliers, and customers. By
giving appropriate corporations a voice in the political process, we help give these
individuals a voice too-permitting investors, consumers, business partners, and
employees to combine their efforts via a common enterprise, and allowing them to be
heard more loudly and effectively than if acting alone, dispersed, and in isolation. That
is not only good for a democratic republic such as the United States, but absolutely
essential.

346. Cf DAN-COHEN, supra note 205, at 62-63 (suggesting that corporate rights may be invoked from
derivative rights of autonomy).
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